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Summary 
 
This dissertation considered the history of the equitable liability for assisting in a breach of 
trust. The position in equity was compared with the position in the criminal law and the 
common law. The aim was to establish if liability in equity should be founded on the 
dishonesty or knowledge of an intermeddling stranger and to consider if the appropriate 
test was being applied. 
 
Liability in equity was historically based on objective knowledge, with a requirement that 
the trustee was also dishonest. However, whilst the requirement that the trustee was 
dishonest was removed, this was replaced with a requirement that the stranger should be 
dishonest. This led to the imposition of a Ghosh style test for objective and subjective 
dishonesty, which has been heavily criticised. The Privy Council and Court of Appeal have 
sought to re-define the test as being objective, however the position remains somewhat 
uncertain. The use of a criminal test for an equitable liability is not appropriate. The 
criminal law has encountered enough problems in trying to define dishonesty. The 
common law has encountered problems due to the ‘privity of contract’ rule. However, the 
common law has evolved to allow for the beneficiaries of a will to sue in the tort of 
negligence and it may also be possible for the equitable owner of goods to sue in 
negligence. 
 
The requirement of dishonesty in equity should be removed altogether and equity should 
return to a requirement of actual knowledge or constructive knowledge ascertained by an 
objective test. There should also be an additional requirement that in the circumstances, it 
is ‘just and reasonable’ to impose liability. Equity and the common law should remain 
separate. Reference to negligence is best avoided, even if the test is similar to this 
common law tort. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The position for legal or equitable recovery against trustees who breach their duty is well 
settled in law1. A constructive trust will be imposed upon a trustee who receives 
remuneration to which he is not entitled2, enters a transaction on his own behalf which he 
should have done on his principal’s behalf3, uses confidential information for his own ends4 
or receives a bribe5.  However, the position becomes far more complex if the trustee has 
dissipated the funds or has insufficient assets to satisfy the beneficiaries’ claims. In such 
circumstances it is necessary for the beneficiaries to cast their net wider in the hope of 
recovering lost funds and consider where the trust property is or if anybody assisted with 
the breach of duty. This dissertation will concentrate on the latter of the two scenarios, 
where the beneficiaries’ sole remaining hope for recovery of the lost funds is against an 
intermeddling stranger who assisted in the breach of trust. Quite often the intermeddling 
stranger (“the stranger”) will be an institution such as a bank6 or professionals, such as a 
solicitor7 or accountant8.  Whilst they will generally have the funds or insurance available to 
compensate the beneficiaries, the courts have been traditionally reluctant to impose 
liability upon them, particularly since the introduction of the requirement of dishonesty9. 
 
1.1 Knowledge and dishonesty 
 
Both the knowledge and dishonesty of the stranger and trustee have been acknowledged, 
by the courts, as two fundamental areas in the development of this area of law. 
Historically, the courts had limited the requirement of dishonesty to the trustee, who must 
have had a fraudulent design when he breached the trust. The stranger did not need to be 
                                                     
1
 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 HL. 
2
 Sugden v Crossland (1856) 3 Sm & G 192; Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1877-78) LR 3  App 
Cas 1218 HL; Williams v Barton [1927] 2 Ch 9 Ch D; Re Macadam (1946) Ch 73; [1945] 2 All ER 664 Ch 
D; Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663. 
3
 Keech v Sandford 25 ER 223; (1726) 1 Sel Cas Ch 61 Ct of Chancery; Re Biss [1903] 2 Ch 40 CA; Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; [1942] 1 All ER 378 HL. 
4
 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. 
5
 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324; Crown Resources AG v Vinogradsky and others 
[2001] All ER. 
6
 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (a bankrupt) and others (No. 4) [1969] 3 All ER 965 Ch D. 
7
 Fyler v Fyler (1841) 3 Beav 550, 49 ER 216; Barnes v Addy (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 244. 
8
 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547. 
9
 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 [35]; JE Penner, ‘Dishonest assistance revisited: Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Eurotrust International Ltd’ [2006] Tru LI 122, 134. 
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dishonest, but had to have knowledge of this fraudulent design. Whilst knowing of a 
fraudulent design may imply dishonesty, there was no express requirement of dishonesty 
on the part of the stranger. Therefore this form of liability was previously known as 
knowing assistance. However, the law has moved away from knowledge being the most 
important consideration. The position now is that there must be a breach of trust and the 
stranger must have dishonestly assisted in the breach of trust. This has further led to 
confusion over whether it is the stranger’s mind or conduct that is dishonest, whether 
conduct alone can be dishonest, without the mind being dishonest and whether the test to 
decide whether the stranger is dishonest should be subjective, objective or a combination 
of the two.  
 
This area will be examined further in detail, with particular attention given to objective and 
subjective dishonesty and knowledge, whether the stranger should be dishonest or simply 
have knowledge of the breach of trust and whether dishonesty is the same as acting 
‘unconscionably’ or with ‘want of probity’. 
 
1.2 Consequences of being found liable in equity 
 
The reason why the courts have increased the evidential burden to one of dishonesty 
could be the remedy which is provided to the victim and the severe financial 
consequences of this remedy. This may also be the reason why many beneficiaries, who 
have been the victim of a fraud, find this remedy to be very attractive.  
 
In the case of Gruppo Torras SA v Al-Sabah10 the Privy Council confirmed that the normal 
rules of causation do not apply to strangers found liable for dishonest assistance. The 
stranger in such circumstances will be jointly and severally liable with the trustee, by way 
of a secondary liability, for the whole loss resulting from the breach of trust. The stranger’s 
liability is only secondary as the action will only arise if there has been a primary breach of 
trust by a trustee. If the trustee does not breach the trust then the stranger cannot be 
liable. However, as the stranger is jointly and severally liable, he may potentially be liable 
for all the loss suffered by the trust regardless as to whether he caused it or not. This flies 
in the face of the normal rules of causation, where the defendant is only liable for the 
consequences of his own actions. Effectively, in equity, the stranger is liable for the exact 
                                                     
10
 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep 36. 
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same losses as the trustee11. This is a very wide and far reaching liability upon the 
stranger and consequently is likely to result in higher and more substantial damages than 
a remedy under the common law would provide. Essentially, the stranger may be liable in 
equity for all the losses suffered by the beneficiaries, whereas in the common law he 
would only be liable for those losses he had caused. 
 
1.3 The dissertation 
 
This dissertation will examine the early and foundation cases on knowing assistance, the 
development of this area of law over the years, including the key case of Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley12. It will examine and compare the requirement of dishonesty and knowledge in 
the criminal law, the common law torts of misrepresentation, interference with a contract 
and negligence and the problems created by the privity of contract rule. Consideration will 
be given to the attempts by the Privy Council13 and Court of Appeal14 to clarify the law 
following the case of Twinsectra15 and the Court of Appeal’s suggestion of the possibility of 
a claim under the equitable remedy of restitution. The dissertation will end with an 
evaluation of the requisite knowledge and dishonesty required in order to establish liability 
upon an intermeddling stranger, a comparison with the position in other areas of law and a 
recommendation whether the requirement of dishonesty on the part of the stranger, who 
assists in a breach of trust, is still appropriate and what the appropriate test should be in 
the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 MacDonald v Hauer (1976) 72 DLR (3d) 110 [129]; Re Bell’s Indenture [1980] 1 WLR 1217 [1231]-[1233];   
NCR Australia Pty Ltd v Credit Connection Pty Ltd (in liq.) [2004] NSWSC1 [150]. 
12
 [2002] UKHL 12. 
13
 Barlow Clowes International Ltd (In Liquidation) v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37.  
14
 Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA Civ 1492. 
15
 Twinsectra (n 12). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EARLY CASES 
 
The earliest cases in the area of knowing assistance focused on the knowledge of the 
stranger. 
 
2.1 The cases of Fyler v Fyler16 and A-G v Leicester Corp17 
 
In Fyler v Fyler18, the strangers who assisted in a breach of trust were solicitors. The 
solicitors had induced a trustee to invest in an unauthorised investment. They had 
knowledge that the money involved was trust money and constructive notice of the terms 
of the trust. Upon this basis, the court found that they must have known that a breach of 
trust was being committed and Lord Langdale confirmed that they ‘ought to be considered 
as partakers in the breach of trust’.  
 
In the case of A-G v Leicester Corp19 Lord Langdale considered the position of an agent 
who acted on the instructions of trustees, with knowledge that this would interfere or assist 
in a breach of trust.  Lord Langdale was clear that even if the agent was following the 
instructions of his principal, he would still be personally answerable. The key point was the 
knowledge of the agent. If he had knowledge that a breach of trust was being committed 
and then interfered or assisted in the breach of trust, he would be liable.  
 
In Fyler the stranger procured the breach of trust with knowledge that a breach of trust was 
being committed. In Leicester Corp the stranger complied with instructions from trustees, 
when he knew a breach of trust was being committed. In both cases the knowledge of the 
strangers was important in the finding of liability and there was no requirement that either 
the stranger or trustee were dishonest.  
 
 
 
                                                     
16
 (1841) 3 Beav 550, 49 ER 216. 
17
 (1844) 7 Beav 176, 49 ER 1031. 
18
 Fyler (n 16). 
19
 Leicester Corp (n 17) [1032]. 
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2.2 Eaves v Hickson20 
 
In the case of Eaves v Hickson21, Sir John Romilly considered the position where honest 
trustees had been tricked into breaching a trust by a stranger. The stranger in this case 
was a father who had forged a marriage document to entitle his children who had been 
born out of wedlock, to be paid trust monies. Unsurprisingly, the stranger was found liable 
for sending a forged certificate to the trustees that he had known was false. Whilst he had 
forged the document himself, he was found liable upon the basis that he knew the 
document was false, so again the knowledge of the stranger was vital to the question of 
liability. The stranger in this case clearly knew that by sending the forged document he 
would be assisting in the breach of a trust. 
 
The court held that the father would be liable for all monies that the children no longer had 
in their possession and could not return. The trustees would only be liable for the 
difference which had not been paid by the father and children. This was a somewhat 
controversial structure, perhaps reflecting the court’s views on the culpability of each party. 
However, nevertheless it did seem inherently fair and just. 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
Ridge and Dietrich22 and Andrews23 pointed out that all three of these cases were drawn 
upon by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan24 to support his contention 
that focus should be on the dishonesty of the stranger. It is submitted however, that these 
cases do not support a case for the requirement of dishonesty. The courts primary concern 
in all three cases was the knowledge of the stranger. The courts did not indicate any 
requirement that either the trustee or stranger should have to act dishonestly. Ridge and 
Dietrich pointed out that in contrast to Lord Nicholls approach, the High Court of Australia 
in the case of Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd25 had considered the same 
nineteenth century cases and taken the opposite approach26. 
                                                     
20
 [1861] 30 Beav 136, 54 ER 840. 
21
 ibid. 
22
 Pauline Ridge & Joachim Dietrich, ‘Equitable third party liability’ [2008] LQR 26, 29-30. 
23
 Georgina Andrews, ‘The Redundancy of dishonest assistance’ [2003] Conv 398, 400. 
24
 [1995] 2 AC 378. 
25
 [2007] HCA 22. 
26
 Ridge & Dietrich (n22) 29. 
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Whilst all three of these cases were groundbreaking cases of their time, they were 
unfortunately not considered in the subsequent and leading case of Barnes v Addy27, 
which will be looked at in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27
 (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 244. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONSIDERATION OF BARNES v ADDY28 
 
The principle arising from this case is credited by Martin29 as creating the category of 
knowing assistance. It was described by Oakley30 as the starting point for every discussion 
on knowing/dishonest assistance and Hudson31 set out the case as providing the 
foundations for modern law on the area of knowing/dishonest assistance. 
 
3.1 The liability of strangers 
 
The strangers in this case were solicitors who had acted injudiciously on the instructions of 
trustees32, but not dishonestly33, and had inadvertently assisted in the misapplication of 
trust property.  
 
It was acknowledged by the court that liability could be:-  
 
‘extended in equity to others who were not properly trustees’.34  
 
However, the court was clear that for liability to attach to the stranger, he must be:-  
 
‘cognisant of a dishonest design on the part of the trustee’.35  
 
This created a primary requirement that the trustee had a dishonest design. This was a 
principle which Martin described as becoming subsequently entrenched in the law36. It 
unfortunately did not take into account the Eaves v Hickson37 situation where the trustees 
                                                     
28
 Barnes (n27). 
29
 Jill E Martin, Modern Equity (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 12-010. 
30
 AJ Oakley, Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) para 10-165. 
31
 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Routledge Cavendish 2010) 878. 
32
 Oakley (n 30) para 10-166. 
33
 Barnes (n 27) [255]. 
34
 ibid [252]. 
35
 ibid [244]. 
36
 Martin (n 29) para 12-012. 
37
 Eaves (n 20). 
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could be honest. As recognised by Halliwell and Prochaska38, Lord Nicholls in Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan39 described this as the law having gone wrong.40 
 
3.2 ‘Cognisant of a dishonest design’ 
 
The dictionary definition of being cognisant is ‘to have knowledge, awareness or to have 
cognition’41. Cognition is ‘an action or faculty of knowing, perceiving, conceiving, as 
opposed to emotion and volition; a perception, sensation, notion or intuition’42.  
 
Therefore the dictionary definition suggests that the stranger must have knowledge of or 
awareness of the dishonest design. It also indicates that ‘cognition’ or a perception, 
sensation, notion or intuition of the trustee’s dishonest design may also be sufficient. 
 
Lord Selborne LC clarified what was meant by ‘cognisant’ and confirmed that this would 
include knowledge of or a suspicion of a fraudulent design43. A view which both Harpum44 
and Oakley45 share. 
 
In the original trial hearing of this action, the stranger gave evidence that he was aware 
that as a general rule what he had done was ‘not a safe thing…’ to do46. However, the 
appeal court applied an objective test to decide whether the stranger had knowledge of the 
‘dishonest design’. The test was:-  
 
‘whether the solicitor ought or ought not from the circumstances of the case, be held 
to have been aware that something wrong was intended47’.  
 
The court concluded upon the basis of ‘evidence, justice and reason’ that they could not 
disbelieve the stranger when he said he did not know nor suspect a dishonest purpose 
and was not liable. Therefore, the court will consider the evidence given and upon the 
                                                     
38
 Margaret Halliwell & Elizabeth Prochaska, ‘Assistance and dishonesty: ring-a-ring o’roses’ [2006] Conv 
465, 466. 
39
 Royal Brunei (n 24). 
40
 ibid [386]. 
41
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9th edn, OUP 1995). 
42
 ibid. 
43
 Barnes (n 27) [245], [252]. 
44
 Charles Harpum, ‘The stranger as constructive trustee: Part 1’ [1986] LQR 114, 120. 
45
 Oakley (n 30) para 10-173. 
46
 Barnes (n 27) [253]. 
47
 ibid [254]. 
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basis of this evidence decide if the stranger should have known or suspected a dishonest 
purpose and decide his liability accordingly. 
 
At the time of this judgment, the common law had its own objective test known as the 
‘reasonable man’ test48. This test was whether the defendant had done, or failed to do, 
something which ‘a prudent and reasonable man’ would have done or not done. The 
‘reasonable man’ test was later adopted and applied in some equity cases, but the 
decision in Barnes v Addy49 was a decision of the Chancery Court of Appeal and pre-dated 
the fusion of equity and law courts by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. Therefore the 
legal jurisprudence between the courts of equity and the common law courts remained 
very much separate.50 
 
3.3 Public policy and commercial reality 
 
The court made clear in this case that it would not take lightly the imposition of liability on 
strangers51 and the doctrine of trusts should not be ‘strained’ by allowing liability where the 
stranger had no knowledge or suspicion of the improper conduct52. It was feared by Lord 
Selborne that the consequences of not applying an appropriate test would be that 
solicitors, bankers or other agents would be unable to act for trusts if they had any doubts 
over the transaction53. He did not want this area of law to impede upon commercial affairs. 
Benjamin recognised Barnes v Addy54 as one of the first cases to recognise there is a 
powerful argument to restrict the role of equitable remedies55.  
 
Sir W M James considered that some cases had gone to the ‘very verge of justice’ in trying 
to make good to beneficiaries at the expense of honest, but injudicious strangers. He 
concluded:- 
 
                                                     
48
 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Ex 781. 
49
 Barnes (n27). 
50
 Daniel J Carr, ‘Equity rising? Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter [2010] Edin LR 273, 276. 
51
 Barnes (n27) [251]. 
52
 ibid [252]. 
53
 ibid [252]. 
54
 ibid. 
55
 Joanna Benjamin, ‘Cukurova in the Court of Appeal’ [2008] Insolv Int 105, 105. 
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‘I do not think it is for the good of the cestuie que trust, or the good of the world, that 
those cases should be extended’56. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
When delivering the decision, commercial realities and public policy weighed heavily on 
the judges minds. They considered that the imposition of liability on honest professionals 
could have grave consequences on the commercial practicality of trusts, by creating 
unnecessary burdens upon those who deal with them. The court therefore created a test 
that would limit the situations of liability for these professionals. A stranger would only be 
liable if the trustee had been dishonest and the stranger had knowledge of the trustee’s 
dishonest design. The knowledge would be objective and upon the basis of what the 
stranger should have known or suspected. 
 
Delaney and Ryan57 described the decision as a distinct doctrinal basis for the imposition 
of liability. However, it arguably led to a very mechanical application to this area of law, 
which had previously been very flexible. Tey58 pointed out the irony that Lord Selborne had 
stated in this very judgment that:- 
 
‘[there is] no better mode of undermining the sound doctrines of Equity than to 
make unreasonable and inequitable applications of them’.59 
 
It is suggested that whilst this mechanical application of the law may have been equitable 
to strangers who unknowingly assist in a breach of trust, its limited nature may have had 
the effect of restricting the growth of this particular doctrine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
56
 ibid [256]. 
57
 Hilary Delany & Desmond Ryan, ‘Unconscionability: a unifying theme in equity’ [2008] Conv 401, 435. 
58
 Tsun Hang Tey, ‘Fiduciaries, third parties and remedies – Singapore’s perspectives and contribution’ 
[2010] Tru LI 234, 237. 
59
 Barnes (n27) [251]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CASES FOLLOWING BARNES V ADDY 
 
The law following Barnes v Addy60 was settled for almost a century. It was not until the late 
1960s, and particularly the early 1990s, when a number of large commercial insolvency 
disputes came before the courts, that the test for the liability of an intermeddling stranger 
was further analysed and developed.  
 
4.1 Can liability be established on negligence? 
 
The case of Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (a bankrupt) and others (No. 
4)61 extended liability to those strangers who assist in a breach of a fiduciary relationship62, 
but was specifically criticised by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan63 for creating 
the tendency of the courts to site Lord Selborne’s formulation in Barnes v Addy64, as 
though it were a statute.  
 
The case involved the dishonest misapplication of company funds through an elaborate 
scheme where the purchaser of a company had effectively used the company’s own 
money to buy it. 
 
The stranger was a bank which had transferred money into the purchaser’s account and 
assisted the purchaser in using this money to buy the company. The court claim made out 
against the bank was that it ought to have known that the payment would be a 
misapplication of company funds65. The court applied an objective test and confirmed:-  
 
‘The plaintiff company’s claim in equity against the District Bank depended on the 
question whether the District Bank should have known, from the facts apparent to its 
                                                     
60
 Barnes (n 27). 
61
 [1969] 3 All ER 965 Ch D. 
62
 Robert Pearce, John Stevens & Warren Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th edn, OUP, 
2010) 971. 
63
 Royal Brunei (n 24) [103]. 
64
 Barnes (n27). 
65
 Selangor (n 61) [968]. 
12 
 
branch officials, that the plaintiff company’s £232,500 was being used in part to 
cover the purchase by Mr Cradock of shares in the plaintiff company’.66 
 
The court concluded:- 
 
‘… a reasonable banker would have concluded that the payment was to finance 
purchase by Mr Cradock of shares of the plaintiff company’.67 
 
The court was solely concerned with what the stranger knew as a matter of fact and if this 
would have indicated to a ‘reasonable banker’ that a breach of duty was being committed 
or put him on inquiry.  
 
The requirement of honesty or dishonesty was not considered at all in Selangor68. The 
bank may have acted honestly, but it was liable because it should have known or at least 
suspected the transaction may result in a misapplication of funds. Neither public policy nor 
commercial realities were considered by the court, which may reflect a change in attitude 
by the court or, more likely, a failure by the parties to raise it as an issue.  
 
The Selangor69 case was followed by Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (No 2)70. The case 
again applied an objective test, as in Selangor71 , focusing on the knowledge of the 
stranger and did not consider dishonesty on the part of the stranger. 
 
It was recognised by Ulph and Allen and Pearce, Stevens and Barr that both Selangor and 
Karak demonstrated that liability could exist upon the basis of constructive notice72 where 
the stranger had been negligent in not realising or discovering that he was assisting in a 
breach of trust73. 
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In the case of Baden v Societe Generale pour favoriser le Developpement du Commerce 
et de l’Industrie en France SA Note74, the court again considered the focus should be on 
the knowledge of the stranger. In this case Peter Gibson J adopted a fivefold classification 
of knowledge, incorporating the possibility of liability for the stranger who negligently failed 
to realise he was assisting in a breach of trust. The levels of knowledge were:-  
‘(i) actual knowledge;  
(ii) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious;  
(iii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and 
reasonable man would make;  
(iv) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and 
reasonable man; and  
(v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on 
inquiry.’ 75 
 
The first three categories related to actual knowledge and what the stranger knew or did. 
The final two categories were termed constructive knowledge and allowed for a negligence 
scenario where the stranger did not have knowledge, but was aware of facts or 
circumstances that should have indicated the facts to him or put him on notice or inquiry, 
as had been the basis of liability in both Selangor76 and Karak77. 
 
4.2 Unconscionable conduct 
 
In addition to the question of knowledge, cases in this area started to examine the conduct 
of the stranger, in light of what he knew. In the New Zealand case of Powell v Thompson78 
Thomas J observed that if the stranger’s conduct was unconscionable then the trustee’s 
conduct would not be relevant and the stranger would be liable to the beneficiary as if he 
was a trustee. This was contrary to the principle that had been established in Barnes v 
Addy79 and would appear to be an attempt to replace the requirement that the trustee was 
dishonest, with a requirement that the stranger was unconscionable.  
 
                                                     
74
 [1993] 1 WLR 509.  
75
 ibid [575]-[576]. 
76
 Selangor (n 61). 
77
 Karak (n 70). 
78
 [1991] 1 NZLR 597. 
79
 Barnes (n27). 
14 
 
This approach did raise the question what is unconscionable conduct? Unfortunately this 
has not been satisfactorily defined. Hayton suggested:-  
 
‘Unconscionable behaviour includes, but is not limited to, dishonest behaviour since 
it encompasses “commercially unacceptable conduct”’.80 
 
Hayton is correct in that unconscionable conduct should not be limited to dishonest 
behaviour only and it is submitted should include generally unacceptable conduct as well 
as commercially unacceptable. The word unconscionable would seemingly relate to a 
person’s conscience. The definition of conscience is ‘a moral sense of right and wrong 
esp. [sic] as felt by a person and affecting behaviour’81. Therefore acting unconscionably is 
behaviour falling below the moral and acceptable standards of the ordinary, reasonable 
and honest person. 
 
In the case of Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v Hawkins82, Wylie J agreed that the 
stranger’s conduct should be unconscionable. However, he confirmed ‘unconscionability’ 
should be measured in accordance with the concept of ‘want of probity’.83 Unfortunately, 
he also did not definitively clarify what this meant. Lord Nicholls suggested that acting with 
lack of probity is ‘simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances’.84 The 
dictionary definition of probity is ‘acting with integrity and uprightness’85. Acting with ‘want 
of probity’, it is suggested is acting without integrity and without morality, which does seem 
a more appropriate description. Petch referring to the dictionary definition confirms that:- 
 
‘Probity means moral excellence, integrity, rectitude, uprightness; conscientious, 
honesty, sincerity. A lack of probity is the opposite’. 86  
 
The requirement that the stranger must act with ‘want of probity’ was supported by both 
Vinelott J in Eagle Trust plc v SBC securities Ltd87 and Scott LJ in Polly Peck International 
plc v Nadir (No 2)88. 
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The judge at first instance in the Court of Appeal case of Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson89 was 
Millet J who later delivered the much applauded dissenting judgment in the House of Lords 
case of Twinsectra90. In Agip91, an accountant had fraudulently altered the payee names 
on 28 payment orders and diverted these payments to ‘dummy’ companies. The dummy 
companies were controlled by two of the accountant’s partners and an employee. They 
were all held at first instance to be liable.  
  
This judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeal which upheld the decision and 
confirmed that a stranger would be liable where he ‘knowingly assisted in a fraudulent 
design’.92 The Court of Appeal confirmed:- 
 
‘the degree of knowledge required was described by Ungoed-Thomas J. in 
Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555, 
1590 as circumstances which would indicate to an honest and reasonable man that 
such a design was being committed, or would put him on inquiry whether it was 
being committed. Peter Gibson J. in Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v Societe General 
pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France S.A. 
[1983] B.C.L.C 325, 407 gave a more expanded description of the circumstances 
constituting the necessary knowledge under five heads… I accept that formulation. 
It is however, only an explanation of the general principle and is not necessarily 
comprehensive’.93  
 
In this case, the strangers were put on inquiry94 and failed to make any inquiries at all95. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that having been made aware of the possibility of fraud, a 
person acting honestly would have made inquiries to satisfy themselves that there was no 
fraud and were therefore liable.96 
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In the case of Re Montagu Settlement trusts97 Megarry VC confirmed that the conscience 
of the recipient must be affected for liability to arise. He referred to the levels of knowledge 
in Baden and considered what level of knowledge that must be established to find that the 
stranger acted with ‘want of probity’. He confirmed that the stranger would need actual 
knowledge and that constructive knowledge would not be sufficient.  
 
Therefore, the position prior to Barnes v Addy98 was that the stranger should have 
knowledge that he is assisting with a breach of trust. Barnes v Addy99 stated the 
knowledge must be of a fraudulent design on the part of the trustee. Selangor 100, 
Karak101, Baden102 and Agip103 stated liability could be imposed for negligence where the 
stranger had knowledge which would indicate to an honest, reasonable man that a breach 
was being committed or would put him on inquiry. The law developed to examining the 
stranger’s conduct, in light of what he knew104 and requiring that the stranger’s conduct be 
unconscionable105 or lack probity106. This move towards the additional consideration of the 
stranger’s conduct, in light of what he knew, resulted in Megarry VC stating in Re 
Montagu107 that the knowledge must be actual and effectively closed the door to liability for 
constructive or negligent knowledge. However, the courts then went on to consider 
creating an even higher evidential burden and looking at whether the stranger’s conduct 
should be dishonest. 
 
4.3 Does the stranger need to be dishonest? 
 
The issue of knowledge and dishonesty was initially considered by the Australian court in 
DPC Estates Pty Ltd v Grey108. In this case, Jacob P expressed doubts over the focus of 
the previous cases being on knowledge, as opposed to dishonesty. These doubts were 
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further echoed by Barwick CJ, Gibbs J and Stephen JJ when the case reached the High 
Court of Australia109.  
 
The doubts over the focus on knowledge, as opposed to dishonesty, were raised in the 
English courts by Buckley and Goff LJJ in the case of Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v 
Williams Furniture Ltd110. Support for a greater focus on dishonesty was also given by Sir 
Clifford Richmond in Westpac Banking Corp v Savin111 and Tompkins J in Marr v Arabco 
Traders Ltd112.  
 
The stranger had historically not had to be dishonest and the requirement of dishonesty 
had the effect of increasing the evidential burden upon a claimant in proving their claim. In 
any event, the relatively new requirement of unconscionable conduct, introduced in Powell 
v Thompson113, is not the same as a requirement of dishonest conduct. Dishonesty has 
criminal connotations, whereas unconscionable conduct is concerned with morality and 
integrity. These are two entirely different concepts, so there were effectively two different 
approaches running concurrently. 
 
In Marshall Futures Ltd v Marshall114, Tipping J recognised that ‘unconscionable conduct’ 
was less blameworthy than dishonest conduct, but considered that dishonest conduct was 
more identifiable than ‘unconscionable conduct’. Tipping J confirmed that he would ‘prefer 
the herald of equity to be wearing more distinctive clothing’ and therefore a test for 
dishonesty would provide a more identifiable and presumably therefore more certain test 
for the courts to apply. However, whilst it may be argued that with a more certain test there 
is less ambiguity, it could equally be argued that this leads to more rigidity in the law, less 
flexibility and consequently increased prospects of injustice.  
 
There was much confusion arising from the different approaches and the Privy Council 
sought to review and clarify the law in the case of Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan115. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 CONSIDERATION OF ROYAL BRUNEI AIRLINES SDN BHD V TAN116 
 
Lord Nicholls, sitting in the Privy Council, reviewed the case of Barnes v Addy117 and the 
existing case law relating to knowing assistance and sought to clarify the position in this 
area of law.  
 
The circumstances of the case were that an airline had appointed a travel company to act 
as its agent. The travel company agreed it would sell the airline tickets and hold all money 
received for the tickets in trust for the airline. The travel company breached the trust, by 
failing to use a separate bank account and later became insolvent. 
 
An action was brought against the travel company’s principal director and shareholder 
alleging that he was liable for knowingly assisting in a fraudulent design on the part of the 
trustee. 
 
At first instance, in the High Court of Brunei, Mr Tan was found to have known that there 
was an express trust of money, the trust money was being used in breach of this trust and 
that he had authorised the use of the money for these purposes. This was sufficient to 
make Mr Tan liable as a stranger for assisting in the breach of trust.118 This decision was 
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Brunei and then to the Privy Council. 
 
One of the key questions addressed by the Privy Council was whether liability of strangers 
who assisted in a breach of trust should be founded on the knowledge or dishonesty of the 
stranger. 
 
5.1 Strict liability 
 
Lord Nicholls considered if knowledge should be required at all and looked at the 
possibility of strict liability. However, he rejected this possibility completely119 and 
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confirmed that a stranger should not be liable if he did not know or have reason to suspect 
that the person he was dealing with was a trustee. He also confirmed that a stranger would 
not be liable if he was aware that he was dealing with a trustee, but had no reason to know 
or suspect that the transaction was inconsistent with the terms of the trust.  
 
5.2 Negligence 
 
At the opposite end of the liability spectrum, Lord Nicholls also considered the question of 
whether strangers could be liable where they were negligent. He looked at the situation 
where the stranger would have been aware of the likely breach of trust had he exercised 
reasonable diligence120. It was recognised that strangers were usually advisers, 
consultants, bankers and agents or officers and employees of companies121 who already 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to the trustees and Lord Nicholls thought 
there was no compelling reason why the strangers should owe a duty to the beneficiaries, 
in addition to the duty they already owed to the trustees. He stated:- 
 
‘as a general proposition… beneficiaries cannot reasonably expect that all the world 
dealing with their trustees should owe them a duty to take care lest the trustees are 
behaving dishonestly’122.   
 
This view was clarified by Gardner as indicating that liability for knowing assistance 
involving negligence is either unnecessary or inappropriate and there should not be a duty 
of care from the stranger123. Simple negligence will not therefore suffice. As surmised in 
Snells Equity:-  
 
‘A negligent or incompetent failure to realise that the transaction was unlawful is not 
enough’. 124 
 
However, Lord Nicholls did concede that a stranger may recklessly assist to such an 
extent that this may call into question the honesty of the stranger, especially if the 
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assistance served to benefit his own interest.125 This had been recognised in Cowan de 
Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust plc126 where Knox J had confirmed that a person can 
be dishonest for reckless actions as well as deliberate actions, if this involved disregarding 
other people’s rights or possible rights.127 
 
5.3 Dishonesty 
 
Martins128 recognised that opinions have differed as to whether dishonesty is required or if 
it would be sufficient to demonstrate that the stranger ought to have known of the breach. 
Lord Nicholls’ was clear that the assistance in the breach of trust must be dishonest and 
held that:- 
  
a person who dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary 
obligation will be liable in equity;  
the stranger’s dishonesty is both a necessary and sufficient ingredient to 
establish liability; and 
whilst there must be a breach of trust, in order to establish liability on the part of 
a stranger, this need not itself be a dishonest and fraudulent breach of trust by 
the trustee129. 
 
This represented a partial return to the position prior to Barnes v Addy130 in that the trustee 
did not need to be dishonest, to impose liability on the stranger. A stranger can procure131 
a breach of trust, as well as assist in one, but there must be some breach of trust in order 
for liability to arise132. However, unlike the position prior to Barnes v Addy133, Lord Nicholls 
was clear the stranger must be dishonest and this was both a ‘necessary and sufficient 
ingredient’ in order to satisfy liability.  
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5.4 Knowledge and unconscionable conduct 
 
Lord Nicholls sought to justify his departure from the requirement of knowledge and 
unconscionable conduct. He argued that the word ‘unconscionable’ was not an everyday 
word, and had its roots in equity, dating back to the concept of the Lord Chancellor as the 
keeper of the royal conscience134. Whilst not directly stating that unconscionability had the 
same meaning as dishonesty, he stated that if they were the same, this is the description 
that should be provided and the word ‘unconscionable’ was best avoided.  
 
Lord Nicholls went on to impose a test of dishonesty, so presumably believed that they 
were the same. The justification for replacing the word ‘unconscionable’ with ‘dishonest’ 
was because the meaning of dishonesty is easier to understand and recognise. However, 
it is contended that ‘unconscionable’ conduct is both a modern and recognisable term. The 
Times Newspaper135 recently printed on the front page a letter from three world leaders, 
Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy confirming that:- 
 
‘the world will be guilty of an “unconscionable betrayal” if the Libyan Leader is left in 
place… ’. 
 
It is clear that this quote is suggesting that conscience and morality demand that the world 
intervenes. As considered in the last chapter, just because a person fails to follow 
generally accepted moral standards or act with integrity does not make him dishonest. 
Dishonesty has its roots in criminal behaviour and deception and whilst it may be easier to 
identify, the purpose of the court of equity is to do justice and what is right. ‘Equity regards 
as done that which ought to be done’. This maxim cannot be served best by an overly 
restrictive test which does not allow for recovery against professionals who have acted 
without morality or conscience but nevertheless were not deemed to be dishonest.  
 
5.5 A state of mind 
 
Lord Nicholls stated that what mattered was the state of mind of the stranger136. This was 
problematic and it is submitted that it is the conduct of the stranger and not his state of 
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mind that is important. The majority of prior case law137, academic opinion138, the Brunei 
Court of Appeal139 and Lord Nicholls’ himself in this judgment140 had previously indicated 
that that focus should be on the conduct of the stranger. This reference to a ‘dishonest 
state of mind’ was regrettably later seized upon by the House of Lords in the case of 
Twinsectra v Yardley to justify a subjective test.  
 
5.6 Objective and/or subjective test 
 
It was recognised by Lord Nicholls that dishonesty was a word with criminal connotations. 
He sought to distinguish the civil position from the criminal position on dishonesty as 
referred to in the case of R v Ghosh141 where a defendant must be dishonest by the 
ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and must also realise this. He 
explained acting dishonestly was ‘synonymous’ with acting with a lack of probity142 and a 
person acting dishonestly was someone not acting as an honest person would in the 
circumstances. It is submitted that this is an admirable attempt to re-define the word to 
justify the imposition of an objective test, which was his intention, but dishonesty is far 
more than failing to act as an honest person would in the circumstances.  Nevertheless, 
Lord Nicholls stated this was an objective standard143, but recognised that honesty had a 
strong subjective element144. He described honesty as:-  
 
‘a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually  
knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or 
appreciated’145. 
  
The conduct would mostly be advertent, not inadvertent conduct146 and the stranger 
should therefore be judged on his conduct, in light of what was known to him at the time. 
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However, Lord Nicholls description of dishonest conduct as ‘conscious impropriety’147, has 
created difficulties in that this term has subjective connotations and suggests some level of 
awareness of doing something wrong. 
 
Pearce Stevens and Barr considered the question whether the stranger must have been 
consciously aware that he was acting wrongly and were firmly of the opinion that at least in 
the context of Royal Brunei, Lord Nicholls was at pains to explain that dishonesty provided 
an objective criterion for assessment of the stranger’s conduct148. Lord Nicholls made clear 
that the test to be applied should not be subjective. He confirmed that:- 
 
‘individuals are [not] free to set their own standards of honesty in particular 
circumstances’; and  
‘the standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective’149. 
  
Honesty cannot be optional. A stranger would not have a defence by simply stating that he 
did not realise he was acting dishonestly or had different moral standards to other people. 
Dishonesty was viewed as not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances and 
intentionally engaging in improper behaviour.  Lord Nicholls reiterated that when 
considering honesty, it is impossible to be more specific other than to say that:-  
 
‘honesty is an objective standard. The individual is expected to attain the standard 
which would be observed by an honest person placed in those circumstances’150  
 
The circumstances that the court would have regard to included:- 
 
‘the nature and importance of the proposed transaction;  
the nature and importance of his role;  
the ordinary course of business;  
the degree of doubt;  
the practicability of the trustee or the third party proceeding otherwise; and  
the seriousness of the adverse consequences to the beneficiaries’151.  
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Therefore, the court would consider from the evidence given what the defendant knew and 
take all of the above circumstances into account to decide if the stranger did what an 
honest person would have done in those circumstances.152 
 
The court will also not only consider what the stranger has done, but what he has failed to 
do. Lord Nicholls considered the courses of action an honest person would take, which 
included:-  
 
‘flatly decline to become involved… ask further questions… seek advice, or insist on 
further advice being obtained’153.  
 
It is clear, as confirmed by Lord Nicholls, that an honest person would not deliberately 
close his eyes or ears, or deliberately not ask questions. 
 
5.7 Public policy and commercial reality 
 
Lord Nicholls recognised that equity was increasingly being used in commercial 
transactions as a remedy and typically where companies had become insolvent. Claimants 
were using equity to seek relief from directors of companies or their bankers or their legal 
or other advisers, with a view to holding them personally liable for assisting in breaches of 
trust or fiduciary obligations. 
 
Lord Nicholls confirmed the purpose of the principle in his judgment was twofold:- 
 
(1) ‘making good the beneficiary’s loss should the trustee lack financial means; and 
(2) imposing a liability which will discourage others from behaving in a similar 
fashion’154. 
 
He thus recognised that the beneficiaries may not always be able to recover their loss from 
the trustees and introduced a public policy argument in favour of the imposition of liability 
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on strangers. The further argument for the imposition of liability as a deterrent represented 
a complete ‘volte-face’ to traditional judicial opinion155. It is clear by suggesting that the 
imposition of liability may act as a deterrent the court is beginning to acknowledge that 
relatively modern day professionals are far more aware of their legal obligations and able 
to adapt their practices accordingly and indeed may only adapt their practices if there is a 
threat of liability. 
 
However, having stated that this judgment was a deterrent, Lord Nicholls added that 
liability should be limited to those strangers who acted dishonestly and with knowledge of 
the breach as:-  
 
‘… ordinary everyday business would become impossible if third parties were to be 
held liable for unknowingly interfering in the due performance of such personal 
obligations’156.  
 
Lord Nicholls thus appeared to be attempting to strike a balance between imposing liability 
as a deterrent and ensuring that ordinary everyday business continued, which was a 
welcome step in the right direction. 
 
The main difficulties from this judgment arose from Lord Nicholls’ attempt to redefine 
dishonesty, his suggestion that the stranger’s state of mind should be dishonest and the 
need for ‘conscious impropriety’. 
 
Acting dishonestly is not the same as failing to act honestly and represent two very 
different degrees of candour. Failing to act honestly is far closer to acting unconscionably 
or without probity, despite Lord Nicholls desire to move away from this description. 
 
The reference to a dishonest state of mind and a need for ‘conscious impropriety’ is 
unfortunate and has created subsequent problems for lawyers and academics alike when 
interpreting this judgment, as will be seen in the consideration of the case of Twinsectra157. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONSIDERATION OF TWINSECTRA LTD V YARDLEY AND OTHERS158 
 
Twinsectra Limited loaned £1 million to an individual upon the basis of an undertaking, 
given by solicitors. The undertaking confirmed that the loan money would only be used for 
the acquisition of property and no other purpose. Upon the basis of the undertaking, the 
loan money was paid over to the solicitors, who then paid the money over to another 
solicitor acting for the borrower, called Mr Leach. Mr Leach was aware of the undertaking 
given by the previous solicitor and the terms of the loan. However, despite this Mr Leach 
subsequently paid the money over to his client, without taking any steps to ensure the 
money would only be used for the acquisition of property. As a consequence, over 
£357,000 was used by the client for purposes other than the acquisition of property159, in 
breach of the original solicitor’s undertaking.160 
 
At first instance it was held that the undertaking did not create a trust and that Mr Leach 
had not acted dishonestly. However, the Court of Appeal found that there was a trust and 
Mr Leach had acted dishonestly and was consequently liable. The case was then 
appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
6.1 Accessorial liability 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Millett provided a succinct overview of the law relating to 
accessorial liability. He stated that for this type of liability there must be some fault on the 
part of the stranger161 and whilst accessorial liability is not based upon receipt of the trust 
property, it will apply if a stranger receives trust property and holds the trust property 
without any beneficial interest in it162. 
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Lord Millet confirmed that the stranger does not have to assist in the original breach and 
will include strangers who assist later on in the breach with ‘covering up’ or helping to 
launder the money163 which represents an important extension of the liability.   
 
6.2 Knowledge 
 
In his dissenting judgment Lord Millett reviewed the case of Barnes v Addy, noting that 
liability would rest where ‘the defendant assisted (i) with knowledge, (ii) in a fraudulent 
breach of trust’.164 Lord Millett stated that as the second condition had been discarded in 
Royal Brunei165, it was only necessary to demonstrate that the defendant had assisted with 
actual knowledge, which meant that he:-  
 
‘… knew all the relevant facts, in particular the fact that the principal was not entitled 
to deal with the funds entrusted to him as he had done or was proposing to do’166.  
 
In Lord Millett’s opinion this meant that the accessory must be guilty of intentional 
wrongdoing167. This was because an honest man would not knowingly participate in a 
transaction which caused the misapplication of funds168. However, Lord Millett had to 
grudgingly accept that Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei169had not applied the requirement of 
intentional wrongdoing, as the condition of liability, and had instead moved away from a 
requirement of knowledge to the requirement of dishonesty170.  
 
Both Lord Hoffman and Lord Hutton agreed with Lord Nicholls and stated that:-  
 
‘… those principles require more than mere knowledge of the facts which make the 
conduct wrongful.’171 
 
Lord Millett’s dissenting opinion was in complete contrast to the opinion of the majority and 
will be examined later. 
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6.3 The dishonesty test 
 
Lord Hoffman and Lord Hutton confirmed that strangers:- 
  
‘require a dishonest state of mind, that is to say, consciousness that one is 
transgressing ordinary standards of honest behaviour”172. 
 
6.4 Objective and/or subjective test 
 
Lord Hutton identified three possible standards to determine whether a person was acting 
dishonestly:- 
 
the purely subjective standard173; 
the purely objective standard174; and  
a combined objective and subjective standard 
 
Whilst an objective approach may be more harsh towards the stranger, Lord Millet was of 
the opinion that this type of approach should be taken and referred to a number of cases 
and practitioner and academic opinions, including Stafford who had invited the Lords to:-  
 
‘reiterate that honesty is an objective standard and that individuals are not free to 
set their own standards of proper conduct’. 175  
 
However, Lord Hutton seized upon Lord Nicholls’ references in Royal Brunei176 to 
‘conscious impropriety’177, the need for advertent conduct and his statement that 
dishonesty had a subjective element178. He confirmed that these references to subjectivity 
all supported his view that Lord Nicholls had embraced a subjective, as well as objective 
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approach. With this in mind, both Lord Hutton and Lord Hoffman went on to deliver a 
judgment confirming their preference for a combined test, incorporating both objective and 
subjective elements.  
 
It is questionable, given Lord Nicholl’s clear statement that an objective standard should 
be applied, whether his reference to the need for ‘conscious impropriety’ was an error. 
Lord Hutton and Lord Hoffman’s interpretation was not so much blinkered when it came to 
the clear statements in Royal Brunei that the standard for dishonesty was an objective 
one, but seemingly blind to all the other references that Lord Nicholls had made to the test 
being objective. 
 
However, upon the basis that the majority in the House of Lords supported his view 
regarding the need for a combined test, Lord Hutton went on to explain what ‘the 
combined test’179 would require:-  
 
‘the stranger’s conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people; and  
that the stranger himself realised that by those standards his conduct was 
dishonest.’ 
 
Thornton180 recognised that this was an almost identical test for dishonesty to that applied 
in the criminal case of R v Ghosh181, which created a further problem as Lord Nicholls had 
clearly stated in Royal Brunei182 that there should be a distinction between the position in 
criminal law and the position in equity.  
 
Lord Hutton suggested that rather than look at specific words, the sentences should be 
read in the context of what else had been written. Lord Nicholls had confirmed in Royal 
Brunei183 that when considering the honesty of an individual, the court should look at the 
circumstances known to the third party and the personal attributes of the third party, such 
as his experience and intelligence184. However, Lord Hutton suggested that this meant that 
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the test should not be objective alone and the stranger would ‘have to be aware that his 
conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people’185.  It 
is questionable that Lord Nicholls had represented or intended this. Whilst there may have 
been a subjective element, this was because all the circumstances of the defendant would 
be taken into consideration when applying the objective test. The test in Royal Brunei186 
did not require that the defendant knew himself that he was acting dishonestly and, as 
identified by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei187, it is wrong to apply a criminal test to a claim 
in equity188. 
 
This judgment has attracted a great deal of academic criticism. Oakley considered that 
whilst Lord Hutton’s statement was consistent with the combined test, it overlooked the 
possibility that the accessory might fail to realise that his conduct was dishonest by the 
ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people189. Kiri described the second limb of 
the majority’s combined test requiring subjective dishonesty as ‘unnecessary and 
unhelpful’190. Thompson suggested Lord Hutton was equating civil liability with a need for 
guilt, which it is suggested is too high a standard on which to make the stranger liable 191. 
Panesar went further and submitted that:-  
 
‘the majority, although purporting to apply the test of dishonesty, did so incorrectly 
and confused it with the test of dishonesty in the context of criminal liability’192. 
 
Further confusion arose as a consequence of Lord Hutton’s contention that a defendant 
could not be dishonest, if he did not know that that what he was doing would be regarded 
as dishonest193. This was because Lord Hutton confirmed later in his judgment that:-  
 
‘he [the stranger] should not escape a finding of dishonesty because he sets his 
own standards of honesty, and does not regard as dishonest what he knows would 
offend the normally accepted standards of honest conduct’194.  
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As confirmed by Martin this would appear to contradict everything that Lord Hutton had 
said earlier about the need for ‘self-conscious dishonesty’. 195  
 
6.5 Lord Millett’s dissenting opinion 
 
Lord Millett also did not agree and his powerful dissenting speech attracted a great deal of 
academic support196. He was of the opinion that in civil matters, liability is usually 
dependent on the defendant’s conduct rather than his state of mind197 and therefore the 
test of dishonesty should relate to the stranger’s conduct and not his state of mind.198  
 
Lord Millett stated that Lord Nicholls had not employed the concept of dishonesty as 
understood in criminal cases199 and had not suggested that the defendant need realise 
that honest people would regard his conduct as dishonest200. 
 
It was clear to Lord Millett, and the majority of academics reviewing the case, that Lord 
Nichols had adopted an objective standard of dishonesty, by which the defendant was 
expected to attain the standard which would be observed by an honest person placed in 
similar circumstances201. Subjective considerations must be taken into account, such as 
the defendant’s experience and intelligence and his actual state of knowledge at the 
relevant time202, but nevertheless this was still an objective approach and recognised by 
academics as acceptable203. 
 
In relation to the assertion that a stranger had to appreciate that he was acting dishonestly, 
Lord Millett confirmed that:-  
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‘the question is whether an honest person would appreciate that what he was doing 
was wrong or improper, not whether the defendant himself actually appreciated 
this’204.  
 
Lord Millett was clear that any test should be made from an objective perspective. 
 
6.6 State of mind or conduct 
 
Lord Millett suggested that as it was the defendant’s conduct that was important, the 
question that should be asked is not whether Lord Nicholls was using the word dishonesty 
in a subjective or objective sense, but whether it was necessary to prove that the stranger 
had a dishonest state of mind or whether proving he acted with the requisite knowledge 
would be sufficient205.  Lord Millett was clear that in his opinion acting with the requisite 
knowledge and judging this on an objective basis should be sufficient. He provided a 
number of detailed reasons for this view206:- 
 
(1) Consciousness of wrongdoing is an aspect of mens rea which is an appropriate 
condition of criminal liability: it is not an appropriate condition of civil liability; 
(2) The objective approach is in accordance with Lord Selborne’s statement in Barnes 
v Addy207 and traditional doctrine... that a person who knowingly participates in the 
misdirection of money is liable to compensate the injured party; and 
(3) The claim for “knowing assistance” is the equitable counterpart of the economic 
torts. 
 
The economic torts will be examined later in this dissertation. 
 
6.7 Does shutting one’s eyes to the problems amount to dishonesty? 
 
Oakley identified that difficulty had arisen in this case because of:-  
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‘the apparent mutual inconsistency of the statements of Carnwath J that Leach, on 
the one hand, had not been dishonest but, on the other hand, had wilfully shut his 
eyes; the difficulty arose because everyone else has always regarded a wilful 
shutting of eyes as amounting to dishonesty’. 208 
 
Lord Hoffman and Lord Hutton described it as unfortunate that the judge had referred to 
Leach wilfully shutting his eyes to the details, problems or implications and attempted to 
explain this anomaly209. They both considered that as Mr Leach was aware of all the facts, 
he could not have possibly shut his eyes and therefore the judge had used the wrong 
terminology. Leach would have been better described as having taken a ‘blinkered 
approach’ or having ‘buried his head in the sand’. It is not entirely clear why taking a 
blinkered approach or burying one’s head in the sand should be treated any different to 
deliberately closing one’s eyes and ears or deliberately not asking questions. Turning a 
blind eye is probably better or more reflective of what he had done. Leach had knowledge, 
but ignored it rather than failed to see it. 
 
Lord Millett confirmed that if a man deliberately shut his eyes to facts which he would 
prefer not to know then this would amount to actual knowledge or ‘Nelsonian 
knowledge’210. Such knowledge in his opinion was intentional behaviour. He believed it 
important to consider what the honest man would do, if the propriety of the transaction was 
doubtful. He concluded that:-  
 
‘… an honest man… would make appropriate enquiries before going ahead’211.  
 
However, Lord Millett did not think this was a case of ‘Nelsonian knowledge’ or wilful 
blindness212. Mr Leach could not have shut his eyes to the facts as he knew all of them. 
The only thing that he did not know was that the terms of the undertaking had created a 
trust. Mr Leach had shut his eyes to the implications of his actions213 and in Lord Millett’s 
opinion this was sufficient enough to impose liability. The approach laid out by Lord Millett 
does seem more logical. 
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6.8 Public Policy and Commercial considerations 
 
Lord Hutton, when delivering his judgment, confirmed that a finding by a judge that a 
stranger had been dishonest was a ‘grave finding’, and was particularly grave against a 
professional man, such as a solicitor214. This consideration has been recognised by 
Pearce, Stevens and Barr215 as weighing heavily on Lord Hutton’s mind when reaching his 
decision. This was also recognised by Lord Millett who stated that:-  
 
‘many judges would be reluctant to brand a professional man as dishonest where 
he was unaware that honest people would consider his conduct to be so’216. 
 
6.9 Did the possibility of a retrial influence the court? 
 
The possibility of a re-trial also influenced Lord Hutton in his considerations, hanging over 
him like the mythical ‘sword of Damocles’. In his final deliberations, Lord Hutton 
considered whether a new trial should be ordered and accepted that there was an 
argument of some force to suggest there should be a retrial217. The important point for 
consideration was that the judge had not defined the test for dishonesty and so there was 
doubt as to whether he had applied the correct test218. If he had not applied the correct 
test, then a re-trial may have been necessary.  
 
Lord Hutton concluded that he believed that it was ‘probable’, that the judge at first 
instance had applied the right test. To reinforce this opinion, it was necessary for Lord 
Hutton to explain how the trial judge had found that Leach was not dishonest, given that he 
had also made a finding that Leach had deliberately closed his eyes to the problems. 
Deliberately closing one’s eyes to the problems would be sufficient to impose liability on 
the basis of an objective test alone. The judge could not therefore have only applied an 
objective test, as if he had, he should have found the solicitor to be dishonest. He also 
could not have applied a purely subjective test, as this approach had been rejected by the 
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courts.219 It was incumbent therefore for Lord Hutton to give a creditable alternative. By 
suggesting that the trial judge had applied a combined test, Lord Hutton could provide a 
plausible explanation as to why the trial judge did not find Mr Leach to have acted 
dishonestly. This consequently meant that it would not be necessary to order a retrial. As 
identified by Oakley:- 
 
‘faced with the consequential choice between ordering a new trial and allowing 
Leach’s appeal, they [the majority] opted for the latter’220. 
 
6.10 A return to knowing assistance 
 
Lord Millet confirmed that he disagreed with treating words such as ‘fraud’ and ‘dishonesty’ 
as being the same as ‘moral turpitude’ or ‘conduct which is morally reprehensible’221. He 
felt:-  
 
‘there is nothing to be said for retaining the language and giving it the meaning it 
has in criminal cases so as to alter the incidents of equitable liability’222. 
 
Lord Millett considered whether the law should return to the traditional description of 
‘knowing assistance’223 where actual knowledge would be sufficient, or alternatively, to 
adopt Lord Nicholls’ description of ‘dishonest assistance’ and apply an objective test224. He 
described the introduction of dishonesty as ‘an unnecessary distraction and conducive to 
error’ and preferred a return to the traditional position of liability arising from ‘knowing 
assistance’225 
 
6.11 Summary of the judgment 
 
Liability for dishonest assistance will arise where a stranger assists by procuring, covering 
up or helping with a breach of trust and will also include those who hold property for a 
client or customer, without a beneficial interest in that property. 
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The dissenting judge, Lord Millett, was of the opinion that knowledge was important and 
liability could be established upon the basis that the stranger must realise that the person 
he was assisting was not entitled to deal with the funds as he was doing or proposing to 
do. He called this ‘intentional wrongdoing’. He did not agree that the stranger must be 
dishonest, but if a test for dishonesty was to be applied this should relate to the stranger’s 
conduct and should be judged objectively. The question was whether an honest person 
with the defendant’s experience, intelligence and knowledge would appreciate that what 
he was doing was wrong or improper. 
 
Lord Hutton and Lord Hoffman considered that the stranger required more than mere 
knowledge of the facts which made the conduct wrongful. The stranger must have a 
dishonest state of mind, that is to say, consciousness that he was transgressing ordinary 
standards of honest behaviour, otherwise known as ‘self-conscious dishonesty’. The 
combined objective and subjective test was applied and the stranger would be liable if his 
conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and if 
he himself realised that by those standards his conduct was dishonest.  
 
It would seem a major consideration in this case that the majority in the House of Lords 
were reluctant to find that the solicitor had acted dishonestly and overturn the trial judge’s 
finding or alternatively, find that the trial judge had erred in law which would have required 
a retrial.  
 
Lord Hutton and Lord Hoffman were wrong to equate civil liability with a need for guilt226 
and the correct test should be objective, taking into consideration the stranger’s 
characteristics as submitted by Lord Millett. 
 
As Lord Millett also stated, dishonesty is not the same as want of probity, acting 
unconscionably or acting without honesty. The use of the word dishonesty is also 
unsatisfactory due to its implied subjectivity and association with criminal activities. This 
has resulted in confusion and misapplication of the law. A return to a focus on the 
stranger’s knowledge and whether his conduct lacked probity or was unconscionable 
would be preferable, even if this may be more difficult to ascertain. 
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However, the irony of Lord Millett suggesting a return to the position of ‘knowing 
assistance’ has not been lost. Pearce, Stevens and Barr pointed out that it was Lord Millett 
himself in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson who had begun the task of cutting the Gordian knot 
of knowledge and replacing it with dishonesty227. 
 
What Twinsectra did was highlight the dangers of linking the criminal law too closely to the 
civil law. The position of dishonesty in the criminal law will be examined further in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF DISHONESTY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Whilst liability for dishonest assistance is a matter for the civil courts, use of language from 
the criminal courts has crept into the civil judgments. In Royal Brunei228 Lord Nicholls 
confirmed it had not been established that the trustee was ‘guilty’ of fraud or dishonesty.229 
In Twinsectra230 Lord Slynn noted the trial judge had ‘acquitted’ the stranger of 
dishonesty.231 There may be a number of reasons for this, including the introduction of 
dishonesty as a criterion in the liability of strangers who assist. This subsequently may 
have resulted in the line between the civil and criminal law becoming blurred and will be 
considered further within this chapter. 
 
The requirement of dishonesty in the criminal law for theft, fraud and handling stolen 
goods will be analysed with consideration of how the position in the criminal law compares 
to the position in equity.  
 
7.1 Theft and dishonesty 
 
7.1.1 Is acting fraudulently the same as acting dishonestly? 
 
Surprisingly, prior to 1916 there was no requirement in the offence of theft that the 
offender be dishonest. The requirement of dishonesty replaced the requirement that the 
offender should be ‘fraudulent and without a claim of right in good faith’.  The reason for 
this change was that it was considered easier for a jury to identify with what was meant by 
dishonesty, than what was meant by fraud232. This is not dissimilar to the argument put 
forward by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei233, for replacing the description of unconscionable 
conduct with dishonesty234.  
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It is submitted that the burden prior to 1916 of acting fraudulently was a higher evidential 
burden than the requirement after 1916 to prove that a person had acted dishonestly. 
Dishonesty is an element of fraudulent behaviour235. A person can be dishonest without 
being fraudulent, but a person cannot be fraudulent without also being dishonest. 
Therefore, whether deliberate or not the change from the requirement of fraud to one of 
dishonesty had the effect of lowering the burden for proving criminal liability. 
Comparatively, the change from a requirement of unconscionable conduct to dishonesty 
achieved the exact opposite effect and increased the evidential burden on the claimant to 
prove liability, as can be seen from the test applied in Twinsectra236.  
 
Dishonesty is now the essential element to the offence of theft and a person will be guilty 
of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another, with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it237.  
 
7.1.2 The exclusion of trustees and personal representatives 
 
The Theft Act 1968, s2(1) provides specific circumstances when the appropriation of 
property may not be dishonest. However, in relation to s2(1)(c) trustees or personal 
representatives are exclusively excluded. This section relates to the position where a 
person has an honest belief that should he take reasonable steps he would not be able to 
find the owner. As a consequence, the trustees or personal relatives will never be entitled 
to the property beneficially, as there will always be someone else who will have a prior 
interest in the property. For example, if the beneficiary of a will cannot be found then the 
trustees may seek a Benjamin order238 from the court to allow them to distribute to the 
beneficiaries. When preparing the statute Parliament clearly recognised that despite the 
trustees having legal ownership of the property, the true owners of the property are the 
beneficiaries of the trust.  
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7.1.3 Is the test for dishonesty objective, subjective or both? 
 
Lawton LJ stated in R v Feely239 that liability could be founded on a purely objective test 
for dishonesty. He stated that jurors when deciding if the accused had acted dishonestly 
should apply the current standards of ordinary decent people and they would have to 
decide from their own lives what is or is not dishonest. Ormerod suggested that an 
imposition of an objective approach has some academic support and would have the 
advantage of consistency with the civil law240. However, Griew identified that the objective 
approach had many defects241. 
 
The question of whether dishonesty characterised a state of conduct or a state of mind 
was further examined by Lord Lane CJ in the key case of R v Ghosh242, which established 
the test for dishonesty in the criminal law. Whilst he accepted that if dishonesty was based 
on conduct then it could be established independently of the knowledge or belief of the 
accused, he concluded that criminal dishonesty is based on an accused’s state of mind. 
The jury should therefore decide if:- 
 
(1) according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what the 
defendant did was dishonest and if it was dishonest by these standards 
(conduct); and 
(2) did the defendant himself realise that what he was doing was by those 
standards dishonest (state of mind).  
 
The clear point arising from Ghosh243 is that in criminal law dishonesty is based on the 
accused’s state of mind, rather than his conduct and therefore a subjective test is 
necessary in addition to the objective test.  
 
The question of whether civil dishonesty is based on a defendant’s conduct or state of 
mind was also addressed by Lord Millett in the civil courts244. It was argued by Lord Millett 
that dishonesty in the civil courts is based on conduct and not the defendant’s state of 
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mind. If Lord Millett is correct, then following Lane CJ’s directions in Ghosh245 that liability 
for conduct could be established independently of the knowledge or belief of the accused, 
it would seem that the correct test to be applied must be an objective one. The difficulty in 
equity has therefore arisen from Lord Hutton and Lord Hoffman’s assertion in 
Twinsectra246 that dishonesty should be adjudged by the defendant’s state of mind. 
 
Mantell LJ considered in R v Rostron and Collinson247 what the prosecution must prove 
that the accused knew in order to find him to be dishonest. The trial judge in this case had 
directed the jury that the accused would have the dishonest state of mind if:-  
 
‘he had known that he was not entitled to do what he was doing’.  
 
Mantell LJ upheld this as a correct direction to apply to establish dishonesty. It is 
questionable whether knowing that you should not have done something is the same as 
knowing you are acting dishonestly, but this does demonstrate that the criminal courts 
have applied a degree of flexibility in the application of this test and that the knowledge of 
the accused is a key factor to establishing dishonesty. 
 
7.1.4 Should there be a general dishonesty offence? 
 
In 1999, the Law Commission examined the requirement of dishonesty and the associated 
problems in requiring a jury to set a moral standard of honesty and then decide if the 
defendant’s conduct fell below that standard. 248 Criminal offences consist of objectively 
defined conduct and mental states, but dishonesty is somewhat an enigma as it is 
necessary for the jury to characterise the existing facts and then make a moral judgment. 
The requirement that the jury make their judgment upon the basis of an undefined moral 
standard is very unusual249 and has resulted in endemic inconsistency with decisions250. 
Whilst dishonesty is an ordinary word used in the English language, there is no guarantee 
that everybody would agree as to its application, particularly in cases which are not ‘clear 
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cut’251. This has not been helped by the inability to conduct jury research, as recognised by 
Ormerod252, although Smith was of the opinion that it may not necessarily be a good thing 
knowing how many errors juries make253. 
 
As confirmed by the Law Commission, the problem is that the dishonesty test is based 
upon a unified conception of honesty and it is unrealistic for a single standard of 
dishonesty to be discernible by twelve random people of varying different ages and 
background. This has led to some jury verdicts being described as ‘anarchic’.254 It may be 
for this reason that the Law Commission were wholly opposed to a general dishonesty 
offence and stated that this would extend the reach of the criminal law too far and render 
criminal that which should not be. Ormerod suggested that it might prove difficult to 
produce a satisfactory legal definition of dishonesty for the simple reason that there is such 
‘plurality of opinion’ on the underlying moral conditions and limits of dishonesty255 
 
It is submitted that Lord Nicholl’s requirement of dishonesty for strangers who assist in 
Royal Brunei256 and the imposition of the combined test in Twinsectra257 had the effect of 
almost rendering criminal that which should not be. It is not appropriate to apply a criminal 
test for dishonesty to a civil claim. The two matters are very different and the courts that 
hear the matters are very different. In a criminal matter, the case is brought on behalf of 
the Crown against an individual, who will be judged by his peers and more often than not 
will have his liberty at stake. This is not the situation in a civil case. A claim will have been 
brought by a beneficiary of a trust or a person in a fiduciary relationship who has usually 
suffered severe financial losses as a consequence of a fraud or breach of trust. If the 
defendant is found liable, there will be financial consequences, but the defendant will not 
lose his liberty. It is also very rare for a civil judge to suggest that a witness is telling a lie 
and rarer still for the judge to make a finding that the defendant is dishonest or fraudulent. 
A civil judge will often go to great lengths to avoid calling a witness or defendant a liar, 
using such phrases as “I think the witness may have been mistaken on this point”. The 
criminal courts very purpose is to establish if a crime has taken place and if so, to punish 
and/or rehabilitate the offender. 
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Therefore, it is submitted that to apply an identical test to civil and criminal matters, is 
incorrect and unduly unfair and prejudicial to a completely innocent civil claimant who has 
suffered significant financial losses, as a consequence of the breach of trust or fiduciary 
position, in which the stranger has assisted.  
 
7.2 The Fraud Act 2006 and dishonesty 
 
The Fraud Act 2006 is described in legal guidance to the Crown Prosecution Service as on 
the borderline between criminal and civil liability.258 Ormerod and Williams cautioned that 
considerable care by prosecutors was therefore needed to avoid over-criminalisation of 
this area259. This section will consider the different forms of fraud introduced by the Fraud 
Act 2006 and compare them with the position in equity. 
 
7.2.1 Fraud by false representation 
 
Under the Fraud Act 2006, s2(1) a person will be guilty of fraud if he dishonestly makes a 
false representation and intends by making the representation to make a gain for himself 
or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. This section 
is described by Ormerod as the broadest form of the fraud offences and likely to be most 
frequently charged260. 
 
The Ghosh test is applied to establish if the accused is dishonest261. Dishonesty is 
described by Williams as the ‘fundamental mens rea element in this offence262. In addition 
to establishing dishonesty, the prosecution must also establish that the representation was 
false. A representation will be false if it is untrue or misleading, which is described in the 
explanatory notes as something ‘less than wholly true and capable of an interpretation to 
the detriment of the victim’.263 In addition to the representation being false, the person 
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making it must know that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading264 and intend to gain or 
cause loss. These form part of the mens rea of the offence with dishonesty.   
 
The requirement of Ghosh dishonesty is the key element of the Fraud Act 2006, as 
identified by Ormerod and Williams265. However, the Government were also clear in their 
consultation paper that the test for knowledge is important which should be considered 
subjectively. The court will look at what the accused subjectively knew and then only if the 
accused subjectively knew that it might be untrue, apply the Ghosh266 test, to establish if 
the accused was dishonest. The two tests are entirely separate, however it is suggested 
that they are both extrinsically linked given that if it is proven that the accused subjectively 
knew that the representation was untrue or misleading this would act as evidence towards 
dishonesty.  
 
Whilst it is not suggested that the test for knowledge in the civil courts should be 
subjective, Lord Millett did suggest that subjective considerations should be taken into 
account in Twinsectra267 such as the defendant’s experience and intelligence when 
applying the objective test for dishonesty268. It is interesting therefore that Lord Nicholls in 
Royal Brunei and the majority in Twinsectra269 suggested that the requirements of 
knowledge are best avoided. It is submitted that there is a link between knowledge and 
dishonesty, especially when establishing dishonesty. A dishonest person will usually have 
knowledge of the transaction and surrounding circumstances that make his assistance 
dishonest. However, it does not necessarily follow that if a person has knowledge that they 
will always be dishonest. This subtle difference indicates that if dishonesty is required then 
knowledge will be relevant, but if only knowledge is required then dishonesty is not 
essential.  
 
7.2.2 Fraud by failing to disclose information 
 
A person will be guilty of this form of fraud if he dishonestly fails to disclose information 
that he is under a legal duty to disclose and intends thereby to make a gain for himself or 
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another or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. This form of 
fraud shares the concept of dishonesty and an intention to gain or cause loss with fraud by 
false representation270. 
 
7.2.3 Fraud by abuse of position 
 
This form of fraud was described by Ormerod and Williams as ‘the most controversial’271. 
A person will be in breach of the Fraud Act 2006, s4 if he:- 
 
(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act 
against, the financial interests of another person; 
(b) dishonestly abuses that position; and 
(c) intends by means of the abuse of that position:- 
i. to make a gain for himself or another; or 
ii. to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. 
 
The difficulty in this offence was confirmed by Ormerod and Williams as identifying 
whether the defendant occupies a relevant financial position272. The Law Commission 
explained the meaning of ‘position’ as:- 
 
‘The necessary relationship will be present between trustee and beneficiary, 
director and company, professional person and client, agent and principal, 
employee and employer, or between partners. It may arise otherwise, for example 
within a family, or in the context of voluntary work, or in any context where the 
parties are not at arm’s length. In nearly all cases where it arises, it will be 
recognised by the civil law as importing fiduciary duties, and any relationship that is 
so recognised will suffice. We see no reason, however, why the existence of such 
duties should be essential. This does not, of course, mean that it would be entirely a 
matter for the fact finders whether the necessary relationship exists. The question 
whether the particular facts alleged can properly be described as giving rise to that 
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relationship will be an issue capable of being ruled on by the judge and, if the case 
goes to the jury, of being the subject of directions’273.  
 
The position is not therefore restricted to circumstances where a fiduciary duty is owed 
and was described by the Crown Prosecution Service as relating to ‘a position of trust’ and 
‘something more than a moral obligation’. 274 It is submitted that solicitors, accountants or 
banks who assist in a breach of trust occupy such a position where they would be liable if 
they dishonestly abused that position and intended to make a gain or cause loss. 
 
This section was criticised by Ormerod and Williams as allowing civil law disputes on 
issues such as family or employment to become issues of criminal law275. Because of this, 
they considered that the element of dishonesty would prove crucial.276 
 
7.2.4 Obtaining services dishonestly 
 
Before the Fraud Act 2006, this offence was obtaining services by deception277, rather 
than dishonestly. Prior to the change, the requirement of deception alone had the 
unfortunate consequence that a person could obtain a service dishonestly and escape 
punishment if he had not actually deceived anyone278. Whilst it was recognised by the 
Government that one of the purposes of this section of the Fraud Act 2006 was to deal 
with the problems raised by ‘deception’ from automated services279, they also recognised 
that it had the effect of redirecting the focus away from deception towards 
‘misrepresentation’280.  
 
As with the other sections, the mental elements of this offence are dishonesty and 
knowledge by the accused that he should pay for the services, with an intention not to pay. 
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7.2.5 Possession of articles for use in fraud and making or supplying articles for use 
in fraud  
 
Under the Fraud Act 2006, s 6(1), a person will be guilty of the offence of possession of 
articles for use in a fraud if he has in his possession or under his control any article for use 
in the course of or in connection with any fraud. Whilst this section does not appear to 
contain any mens rea281, according to the Government the accused will have a general 
intention (rather than specific intention) that the article is used for some future fraud282. 
Interestingly, there is no requirement of express dishonesty. 
 
In accordance with the Fraud Act 2006, s7(1) a person will be guilty of the offence of 
making or supplying articles for use in fraud if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to 
supply any article:- 
 
(a) knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in 
connection with fraud; or  
(b) intending it to be used to commit, or assist in the commission of, fraud. 
 
Again, with this offence, there is no express requirement of dishonesty. Guilt will depend if 
the accused had the requisite knowledge or intention. However, establishing that the 
accused had knowledge that the property would be used in connection with a fraud or an 
intention of it to be used to commit or assist a fraud would seem to imply dishonesty. 
 
All the previously considered changes in the Fraud Act 2006 relate to where the accused 
is the primary offender. But, the most interesting introduction from the Fraud Act 2006 
related to the change in law where a person assists in a fraud. It is submitted these 
offences are more closely related to those carried out by the stranger in equity. Notably, 
both the offences of possession of articles for use in fraud and making or supplying articles 
for use in fraud do not have any express requirement of dishonesty. There is no 
requirement that the accused has been dishonest or fraudulent. Knowledge or intention 
are the two key areas to establish liability.  
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The position in Twinsectra283, in applying Ghosh284 dishonesty to secondary liability, meant 
that the test being applied in the civil courts was actually higher than the test now being 
applied in the criminal courts for assisting in a fraud. For the offences of possession and 
supplying articles for use in a fraud, only evidence of an intention or knowledge is required. 
This, it is submitted, simply cannot be right. 
 
Scanlan and Kiernan highlighted that the effect of incorporating a requirement of 
dishonesty into an offence, is that it can predominate all of the issues to be considered by 
the court and stated:-  
 
‘In pursuing such cases, the amount of evidence devoted to establishing that the 
conduct of the defendants is dishonest is disproportionate (if one takes an 
academic view) compared to the other limbs of the offences charged. This is 
because it is rare for a jury to contemplate convicting a defendant unless they are 
satisfied that his conduct was thoroughly dishonest. Indeed, in many cases, the 
actus reus aspects of the offence are often largely or wholly admitted and it is upon 
the issue of dishonesty that the trial concentrates.’285 
 
This may have been a reason that the offence of dishonesty was omitted from these two 
offences. It is submitted by the writer that the introduction of a requirement of dishonesty in 
equity has had a similar effect to that in the criminal law and has led to an over emphasis 
on the dishonesty element of the liability and less focus on what the stranger has actually 
done or failed to do. It may be time to consider returning to a liability without the need for 
dishonesty and the criminal connotations that are associated with it. 
 
7.3 Handling stolen goods 
 
Under the Theft Act 1968, s22(1) a person will handle stolen goods if knowing or believing 
them to be stolen goods, he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or 
assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another 
person, or if he arranges to do so. 
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The accused must therefore know or believe the goods to be stolen and dishonestly 
receive or undertake or assist in handling the goods. 
 
The Ghosh286 test is applied and according to R v Smith287 the dishonesty must be vis a 
vis the owner of the goods or someone who has a proprietary interest in the goods that 
have been stolen. 
 
7.3.1 Knowing or believing the goods to be stolen 
 
Whilst the question of dishonesty when handling stolen goods is at least in theory, 
relatively straightforward, the test to be applied for ‘knowing’ or ‘belief’ was not. Bramwell B 
in R v White288 stated that the accused would have the requisite knowledge if:-, 
 
‘with regard to the circumstances of the transaction, he believed that the goods had 
been stolen’.  
 
However, in the absence of statutory assistance, this test evolved into one requiring actual 
knowledge alone. The Criminal Law Revision Committee (“CLRC”) recognised the 
requirement of actual knowledge to be a serious defect of the criminal law and quite often 
the circumstances were such that the receiver ought to be found guilty, but guilty 
knowledge did not exist289. The CLRC gave an example of the person who bought goods 
at a ridiculously low price in a public house. He might not know the goods were stolen, but 
it may be clear that he believed the goods were stolen. The statutory addition of ‘belief’, as 
an alternative to knowledge was therefore welcomed290.  However, the CLRC were at 
pains to distinguish this situation from the person who was merely careless, in that he had 
not made sufficient inquiry, and who would not be found guilty, under section 22(1). 
 
When considering the knowledge or belief of the accused, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that the accused had the requisite knowledge or belief at the time he handled the goods291 
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and it will be sufficient if he had a knowledge or belief of the general nature of the goods, 
without having a specific knowledge of what the goods are.292 The court will also take into 
consideration the circumstances upon which the goods were obtained when considering if 
the accused knew or believed that they were stolen.293  
 
The case of R v Forsyth294 related to a defendant who had been accused of handling 
£400,000 which had been stolen by Asil Nadir, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Polly 
Peck International. Fraud involving Asil Nadir and Polly Peck International had also been 
subject to a claim in equity295. The judge at first instance in R v Forsyth described belief 
as:-  
 
‘the state of mind of a person who says to himself I cannot say I know for certain 
that this money is stolen, but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the 
light of all the circumstances, in the light of all that I have heard and seen.’  
 
He also considered that the accused will still be guilty if he shut his eyes to the obvious. 
The appellant in this case criticised the direction upon the basis that ‘belief’ does not 
import an objective test and is not the same as ‘shutting one’s eyes to the obvious’. It was 
indicated that ‘belief’ could be constituted by unreasonable uncertainty and a refusal to 
believe the obvious. 
 
The Court of Appeal reviewed the law in respect of knowledge and belief. In Atwal v 
Massey)296 Lord Widgery CJ emphasised that the question was a subjective one:-  
 
‘whether the accused suspecting the goods to be stolen, deliberately shut his eyes 
to the consequences?’ 
 
However, James LJ stated in R v Griffiths297 the question is:-  
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‘whether the defendant knew or believed the goods to be stolen because he 
deliberately closed his eyes to the circumstances’.  
 
Therefore the action of deliberately closing his eyes is a matter of evidence from which the 
jury could infer belief. 
 
In the case of R v Moys298, the Court of Appeal considered that:-  
 
‘a very strong suspicion that the property was stolen, coupled with the accused 
shutting his eyes to this possibility was insufficient to establish belief.’ 
 
Lord Lane CJ suggested in R v Grainge299 that the question is subjective and whilst 
suspicion and shutting one’s eyes to the circumstances is not enough, it may be taken into 
account by the jury when deciding if the accused had the necessary knowledge or belief. 
 
In R v Hall300, Boreham J considered that belief is something short of knowledge. This 
state of mind may arise where the accused cannot say for certain that the goods are 
stolen, but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the 
circumstances and all that the accused has heard and seen. He also confirmed the 
accused would still have sufficient ‘belief’ if he refused to believe all that he had seen and 
heard and what his brain tells him is obvious.  
 
The Court of Appeal considered all of these cases in R v Forsyth301 and the direction given 
by the judge at first instance. It was held that the judge had misdirected the jury. The 
ordinary meaning of belief is:-  
 
‘the mental acceptance of a fact as true or existing’.  
 
It was accepted that between suspicion and actual belief there may be a range of 
awareness, but the jury must be satisfied that the accused actually believed that the goods 
were stolen. Bedlam LJ then went on to refer to the guidance provided in R v Moys302 as 
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being the appropriate guidance to be given. His reason was that it is more readily 
understandable to juries and there is therefore less chance of confusion which would arise 
from guidance such as that provided in R v Hall303. 
 
The technical legal debate over the interpretation of what suspicion and actual belief is can 
be understood in the context of criminal law, where a person’s liberty may be at stake. 
However, this does highlight how difficult it can be to ascertain if an individual has 
sufficient knowledge of the criminal offence. It would be extremely difficult in a complex 
fraud case to prove that a stranger had more than a very strong suspicion of fraud, if he 
denied he had any suspicion. However, as considered earlier, this does demonstrate that 
focus in civil cases should be on the conduct of the stranger and not his state of mind, as 
confirmed by Lord Millett304.  A stranger’s state of mind should not be considered and 
subjective knowledge should remain the preserve of the criminal courts. As confirmed by 
Lord Millett:- 
 
‘Consciousness of wrongdoing is an aspect of mens rea which is an appropriate 
condition of criminal liability: it is not an appropriate condition of civil liability’305. 
 
7.4 Negligence in the criminal law 
 
The criminal courts have understandably always had difficulty in imposing punishment for 
negligence. The possibility of imposing a criminal punishment for negligence was 
considered by Spencer and Brajeux306. They identified that the reason for such reluctance 
in the criminal courts has traditionally been for two reasons:- 
 
(i) ‘the threat of punishment only works in respect of deliberate and conscious 
behaviour, so ‘punishing negligence is cruelty without purpose’ (“the 
utilitarian reason”); and 
(ii) it punishes those who ‘couldn’t help it’ (“the unfairness reason”).307 
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Spencer and Brajeux argued that the legal philosopher Herbert Hart justified the imposition 
of criminal liability for negligence upon the basis that the risk of incurring punishment 
makes a person stop and think. Herbert Hart stated:- 
 
‘[T]he threat of punishment is something which causes him to exert his faculties, 
rather than something which enters as a reason for conforming to the law when he 
is deliberating whether to break it or not. It is perhaps more like a goad than a 
guide’.308 
 
In relation to the issue of unfairness, Spencer and Brajeux argued that as long as the 
person could have complied with the law by trying a little harder, then punishment would 
not be unfair.309  
 
7.4.1 Comparison with equity 
 
It is submitted that the imposition of a criminal punishment for an act of negligence is very 
harsh, due to the possibility of a person losing his liberty. However, whilst it is conceded 
that a finding of dishonesty in the civil court will likely have adverse consequences to a 
professional’s reputation and career, the civil court does not have the power to imprison a 
defendant. In such circumstances, Spencer and Brajeux’s comments may be far more 
appropriate as in civil law the consequence of being found liable is only financial. 
 
There needs to be a balancing act between the rights of the professional and the rights of 
the beneficiaries of a trust. As has been considered already far too much weight has been 
given to the rights of the professional, due to fear of some commercial and financial 
breakdown if they are to be found liable. However, it should be remembered that these 
cases are heard in a civil and not criminal context and if the threat of liability could make 
professional strangers stop and think about the beneficiaries and try a little harder to 
protect the beneficiaries’ interests, then this must be for the benefit of not only the 
beneficiaries, but the future of trusts as a financially secure means of protecting financial 
interests. Why should a negligent professional’s interests be more important than those of 
an innocent beneficiary who has suffered loss? The common law torts will be considered 
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further and the next chapter will consider the position of misrepresentation which can be 
either fraudulent or negligent. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TORT OF MISREPRESENTATION 
 
8.1 Fraudulent misrepresentation 
 
A fraudulent misrepresentation is a statement of existing fact, opinion or of the law310 and 
will usually be a belief or opinion that the person who makes it does not hold311 or a 
statement of an intention to do something when he has no such intention.  
 
8.1.1 Dishonesty 
 
The key element of fraudulent misrepresentation is dishonesty, as confirmed in Henry 
Ansbacher & Co Ltd v Binks Stern312. The maker of a false ambiguous statement will be 
liable for fraud if he intends it to have a meaning that he knows is not true. This will even 
be the case if the statement turned out to be true313. 
 
It is therefore important to establish if the person who makes the statement believes that it 
is true. If he believes the statement to be true, he will not be liable for fraud314. This would 
suggest that liability has a subjective requirement and was considered by Lord Jenkins in 
the case of Akerheilm v De Mare315. He believed fraud had a subjective requirement. He 
stated the question is not whether the defendant honestly believed the representation to 
be true on an objective basis, but whether he honestly believed the representation to be 
true in the sense in which he understood it, albeit erroneously when it was made. The test 
according to Lord Jenkins was therefore a subjective one. 
 
In Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd316 the Court of Appeal conceded that it would be possible to 
infer fraud from very clear undisputed documents, but made clear it is really the role of the 
trial judge to decide if the defendant is liable or not. In order to establish liability for a 
fraudulent misrepresentation the representation must be false and it must be intended to 
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be fraudulent. However, the Court of Appeal did not specify if the test to be applied would 
be objective or subjective. 
 
It should be noted that in both cases the trial judge had acquitted the defendants of fraud 
after seeing and hearing their evidence, and certainly in Gross v Lewis Hillman317 a re-trial 
would have been necessary if the trial judge’s finding had been reversed. It was confirmed 
in Akerheilm v De Mare318 that the trial judge’s decision should not be displaced on appeal 
except on the clearest grounds, which may explain the reluctance of the appeal courts to 
go behind the trial judge’s decision. 
 
8.1.2 Agents 
 
It is common in commercial transactions for agents to be involved and acting on behalf of 
one of the parties. The position where an agent acting within the scope of his instructions, 
makes a statement that he knows is false, is that both the agent319 and the principal320 will 
be liable for fraud. An agent will not however, generally be liable for the fraud of the 
principal if he has no knowledge that the statement is false321. The key element with 
agents is therefore knowledge. 
 
8.1.3 Is there a criminal or civil burden of proof? 
 
It has long been accepted that ‘fraud’ has criminal connotations and the Court of Appeal 
considered in Hornal v Neuberger Products322 whether the burden of proof in these cases 
should be ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘on the balance of probabilities’.  Denning LJ 
stated that the standard of proof will depend on the nature of the issue and the more 
serious the allegation, the higher the degree of probability that will be required. Hodson LJ 
confirmed there were degrees of probability, which would depend on the subject matter. 
For an allegation of fraud, a civil court would require a far higher degree of probability than 
for an allegation of negligence. It was conceded however, by both Denning LJ and Hodson 
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LJ that the civil court would not adopt so high a degree of proof as a criminal court. 
Therefore, whilst it is not necessary to prove liability beyond a reasonable doubt, it is clear 
that the burden of proof in civil fraud cases is far higher than the usual burden applied in 
the civil courts of the balance of probabilities. 
 
8.1.4 What must the claimant prove? 
 
In the case of Wallingford v Mutual Society323 the House of Lords confirmed that the 
common law rule when making an allegation of fraud, is that general and vague 
allegations will be insufficient to establish fraud. However, whilst requiring allegations of 
fraud to be specific, the House of Lords did state that fraud can be implied from an actual 
fact or circumstance.  
 
Lord Selborne who had been sitting in the House of Lords in Wallingford324 confirmed in 
Smith v Chadwick325 that the claimant must prove there was an actual fraud and that the 
fraud induced the contract. He stated that the knowledge and intention of the defendant 
were the important factors when considering if an actual fraud had taken place.  
 
The House of Lords in the leading case of Derry v Peek326 stated that the claimant must 
prove that the defendant made the statement knowingly or without belief in its truth. The 
defendant could be reckless in making the statement without belief in its truth, but mere 
carelessness was not sufficient. In order to establish liability, the claimant must 
demonstrate that the defendant had a dishonest intention and this was an objective test. 
The claimant must show that an honest man would not have done as the defendant did. 
When applying this objective test, the court would consider if the defendant had 
reasonable grounds for believing the statement and look at the defendants knowledge and 
means of knowledge. 
 
Whilst the courts will look at the defendant’s knowledge and means of knowledge, it is not 
necessary that the maker of a false statement is ‘dishonest’ as that word is used in the 
criminal law327. In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No.2)328 
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Evans LJ confirmed that if the false statement is made knowingly and the maker of the 
statement has the intention that his statement shall be acted upon by the person to whom 
it is addressed, then this will be sufficient for liability to be established.  
 
8.1.5 Should a failure to take reasonable care be fraudulent? 
 
Lord Herschell had expressed the opinion in Derry v Peek329 that when representations 
are made in a commercial context there is a moral duty to take reasonable care and that 
this moral duty should be converted into a legal obligation. He did concede however, that 
this would be a matter where the legislature must intervene and the law should not be 
strained to make a failure to take reasonable care, fraudulent. 
 
8.1.6 Comparison with the position in equity 
 
As with the position in equity for dishonest strangers, in the case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation the key issue is honesty. If the person making a false statement is 
honest, then he will not be liable for fraud, just as in equity if the stranger is honest, he will 
not be liable for assisting in a breach of trust. There are other similarities in the approach 
taken in Twinsectra330 and Akerheilm v De Mare331. In both cases, the subjective 
knowledge of the defendant was important to ascertaining if the defendant was 
dishonest/fraudulent. It is suggested that it is more than just coincidence that in both 
Twinsectra332 and Akerheilm333, a failure to allow a subjective test would have resulted in a 
retrial.  
 
The decision however to apply a subjective test has led to uncertainty and confusion. It is 
submitted that the correct test to be applied is an objective test which concentrates on the 
knowledge and intention of the defendant, as confirmed in Smith v Chadwick334, Derry v 
Peek335 and Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No.2)336. The 
approach of concentrating on the knowledge and intention of the defendant bears many 
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similarities with the position in equity prior to the introduction of the requirement of 
dishonesty in Royal Brunei337.  
 
Interestingly, Lord Selborne who delivered the judgment in the leading case in equity of 
Barnes v Addy338 was also involved in both the cases of Wallingford v Mutual Society339 
and Smith v Chadwick340. In both areas of law the defendant’s knowledge was the 
essential component of liability, which was established objectively. 
 
In Derry v Peek341, Lord Herschell considered that at least in a commercial context, 
makers of representations to induce contracts had a moral duty to take reasonable care 
and that this moral duty should be converted into a legal obligation. This is commendable 
and there should be no reason why banks, solicitors, accountants and other professionals 
when entering into contracts with trustees should not have to take reasonable care and be 
found liable in negligence where they fail to do so. Professionals who contract with 
trustees have an even greater moral duty towards the beneficiaries of a trust.  
 
The requirement of dishonesty was only introduced by Royal Brunei342 relatively recently. 
Did its introduction result in the law taking another wrong turn? As recognised in Hornal v 
Neuberger Products343 an allegation of fraud or dishonesty requires a higher degree of 
proof than is normal in the civil courts. It is therefore suggested that the problems that 
have arisen in equity from all the confusion over what the correct test is to apply, whether 
the test should be subjective, the difficulty for beneficiaries to succeed in such a claim and 
the potential consequences to the reputation and career of the defendant have all arisen 
from the requirement of dishonesty. Therefore, the test should return to one of knowing 
assistance only. Further, if liability in equity returned to the requirement of knowledge 
alone, then a failure to take reasonable care should not be as difficult a proposition to 
establishing liability for negligence. This dissertation will now consider the position in 
negligence and specifically negligent misrepresentation. 
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8.2 Negligent misrepresentation 
 
Negligent misrepresentation may arise where a person honestly makes a statement of 
belief but fails to check the facts and could easily have done so344. It will be negligent if it is 
made carelessly and in breach of a duty to take reasonable care that the representation is 
accurate345. 
 
8.2.1 The need for a special relationship 
 
There are a number of cases involving negligent misrepresentation, where the 
misrepresentation was provided by a third party. In the key case of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd 
v Heller & Partners Ltd346 a bank gave a credit reference to the claimant, for one of its 
account holders. In such circumstances the House of Lords held that a bank owed a duty 
to take reasonable care. However, the duty will only arise if there is a special relationship 
between the parties.  A special relationship will arise when:- 
 
(i) it is reasonably forseeable by the representor that the representee will rely 
on the statement; 
(ii) there is sufficient ‘proximity’ between the parties; and 
(iii) it is just and reasonable for the law to impose the duty.347 
 
The representation must be made in the context of a professional relationship and no 
action will normally arise from careless friendly advice given in a purely social 
relationship348 or by a company not engaged in the specialist field of giving skilled 
advice.349 In such instances it would be clearly unjust and unreasonable to impose a duty. 
The key point arising from Hedley Byrne v Heller is that liability may arise even though 
there is no contractual relationship between the representor and representee. Thus 
professionals350 and banks351 have duties to others when making representations on 
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behalf of their clients and may be found liable in negligence if these representations are 
wrong and they should have known they were wrong.  
 
8.2.2 Has the defendant assumed responsibility? 
 
In the case of Caparo Industries v Dickman352, whilst Lord Bridge was against the 
extension of a prima facie duty of care, he did concede that it would be preferable to 
develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories. With this in mind, Lord Bingham considered an alternative test to the three 
stage test, in Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc353. This case did not 
relate to negligent misrepresentation, but its principle may be applied to such cases. It 
confirmed that a special relationship may exist where the defendant has assumed 
responsibility for what is said or done to another. It will usually have all the indicia of a 
contractual relationship, save for consideration. If an assumption of responsibility could be 
shown then this would be a sufficient, but not necessary condition to establish liability. If 
there was no ‘assumption of responsibility’ then the three stage test could be considered. 
 
Lord Bingham made clear that the test for assumption of responsibility is an objective one 
and the court would not consider what the defendant thought or intended. The court was 
solely concerned with what could be inferred from the defendant’s conduct taking into 
account the detailed circumstances of the particular case and the relationship between the 
parties.  
 
8.2.3 Comparison with the position in equity 
 
In the case of a negligent misrepresentation, a bank or professional may be found liable to 
the parties to a contract, even though he is not a party to the contract himself. It is 
submitted that there is therefore a precedent in the common law to finding a third party to a 
contract liable for negligent assistance. In the common law this takes the form of an oral or 
written representation, but there is no reason why this should not be applied in relation to 
contracts where the third party is providing a similar service such as legal or financial 
representation. For example the solicitor in Twinsectra354 was clearly negligent. He took 
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money aware of the terms of an undertaking and then released the money in breach of 
that undertaking. When he initially received the money he was ‘assuming responsibility’ for 
the money. This alone would be sufficient to find liability under the assumption of 
responsibility test.  
 
The three stage test could be equally applied and result in a finding that Leach was liable. 
The reliance must have been reasonably forseeable and it is submitted that a solicitor 
receiving money with notice of an undertaking in respect of that money could foresee that 
by releasing the money in breach of the undertaking, the beneficiary of the undertaking 
may suffer loss. Further, by receiving the money with notice of the undertaking and holding 
the money on trust in the client account, there would be sufficient proximity between the 
claimant and solicitor. Finally, the action of releasing the money in breach of trust and 
without taking any reasonable action to ensure that the terms of the trust were complied 
with would suggest that in all the circumstances it would be just and reasonable to impose 
liability.  
 
Lord Bridge recognised in Caparo Industries v Dickman355 that it is preferable to develop 
novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories. It 
is submitted that the liability of strangers in equity is such an established category. Indeed, 
equity has effectively imposed liability on strangers in the past for negligently assisting in a 
breach of trust, as considered earlier in the cases of Selangor356 and Karak357.  
 
Negligent misrepresentation has demonstrated that industry has not ground to a halt as a 
consequence of the imposition of liability on third parties. In fact, it could be argued that as 
a consequence of this liability, agents have taken better precautions to ensure the facts 
which they relay are true and has resulted in industry suffering less problems. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN THE COMMON LAW 
 
9.1 The privity of contract rule 
 
The common law has encountered difficulties in finding third parties to a contract 
negligent, since the case of Tweddle v Atkinson358, where Wightman J stated that no 
stranger to the consideration could take advantage of a contract even though made for his 
benefit.  
 
This principle was followed in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd359 
where the House of Lords confirmed that it was a fundamental principle of English law that 
only a party to a contract who had given consideration could sue on it.  
 
In Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd360, Viscount Simonds suggested that the principle 
of ‘jus quaesitum tertio’ (the right of a third party to a contract to sue) should only be 
introduced through legislation.361 
 
The failure of the law to allow a third party to a contract to sue has been strongly criticised 
in the House of Lords362. Steyn LJ stated that there is ‘no doctrinal, logical or policy 
reason’ for it363. Denning LJ pointed out in Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt364, 
that for the 200 years prior to the case of Tweddle v Atkinson, it was settled law that, if it 
was intended that the contract be enforceable by the third party, then in common law, the 
contract could be enforced by the third party.365 Denning LJ indeed made attempts to allow 
claims made by third parties but to no avail366. 
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In 1996, the Law Commission made a number of recommendations, including reforming 
the privity rules through a detailed legislative scheme. 367 However, it made clear that by 
introducing such a scheme it did not want to hamper any judicial creativity in this area.368 
The Report highlighted that in the United States, New Zealand and parts of Australia, the 
privity rule had already been abolished369 and most member states of the European Union 
recognised and enforced the rights of third party beneficiaries under contracts370. 
 
The recommendations were followed and led to the enactment of the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 (“C(RoTP)A 1999”). However, whilst the C(RoTP)A 1999 did give 
some third parties the right to enforce contracts and a general exception to the third party 
rule, the general rule was left intact.371 As a result, the Act has been described as an 
exception, rather than a departure from the common law doctrine of privity.372 
 
9.1.1 Application of the doctrine of privity of contract in equity 
 
This doctrine has created many problems in equity as the beneficiaries are not a party to 
the contract between the stranger and the trustees. The court of equity has traditionally 
been reluctant to impose duties upon strangers for fear of the impact on commercial 
transactions. However, the privity rule is in legal terms only relatively new and has been 
abolished in many countries with a common law jurisdiction, without any adverse effect. It 
has been recognised by the Law Commission, Parliament and many in the House of Lords 
that this doctrine is restrictive and can be harsh to innocent third parties who may have 
suffered loss through no fault of their own. It is therefore submitted that the beneficiaries of 
a trust should be able to enforce a contract or sue under a contract between the trustees 
and a stranger. After all it is the trust fund that pays the stranger’s fees and the 
beneficiaries are the owners in equity of the trust fund. The trustees may have legal 
ownership but are not the equitable owners of the fees. Having considered the doctrine of 
privity of contract and the problems that it has created, the common law has demonstrated 
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that it is possible to circumnavigate this particular doctrine in relation to claims under the 
tort of negligence. This will be considered in the next section. 
 
9.2 Liability in the tort of negligence 
 
Since the key case of Donoghue v Stevenson373 it has been possible to impose a duty of 
care to third parties, which if breached, will allow the third parties to sue under the tort of 
negligence. However, the courts have been reluctant to extend this duty too far in 
contractual relationships, for fear of upsetting the contractual relationship and creating 
uncertainty374. 
 
Generally, in the law of negligence and in claims for pure economic loss the two tests 
which are applied are the objective ‘assumption of responsibility’ test or the three stage 
test, as considered earlier375.  
 
Under the assumption of responsibility test, the third party must have a relationship with 
the contracting parties which is ‘equivalent to contract’376. Its function is to make up for the 
shortcomings of contract where consideration has not been provided377 or if problems 
have arisen as a consequence of the privity of contract doctrine378. 
 
In the case of Riyad Bank v Ahli United Bank (UK) plc379 a successful claim was brought 
by a third party to a contract for negligent advice. Liability was found upon the basis that 
there had been an assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant towards the 
third party. Longmore LJ stated:-  
 
‘there cannot be a general proposition that, just because a chain exists, no 
responsibility… is ever assumed to a non-contractual party. It all depends on the 
facts’380 
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9.2.1 Claims by the beneficiaries of a will 
 
In the cases of Ross v Caunters381 and White v Jones382 the courts considered the position 
if a solicitor negligently drafted or failed to draft a will and if the beneficiaries would have a 
claim against the solicitor, even though they were not a party to the contract. 
 
In Ross v Caunters383 a solicitor drafted and sent out a will to his client for execution. The 
solicitor failed to advise the client that the will should not be witnessed by the spouse of a 
beneficiary and the will was subsequently witnessed by a beneficiary’s husband. As a 
consequence, the gift to the intended beneficiary failed. The solicitor admitted negligence, 
but argued that he only owed a duty to the client with whom he had contracted. The court 
held that the solicitor owed the beneficiary a duty of care, as the beneficiary was within the 
solicitor’s direct contemplation as a party who could be injured by a failure to follow the 
client’s instructions and draft the will correctly. 
 
Although Ross v Caunters was subjected to some criticism384, in White v Jones385 the 
House of Lords upheld the principle. In this case the solicitor had been instructed to draft a 
new will, to include two of his client’s daughters as beneficiaries, who had been ‘written 
out’ of the last will due to a family argument. Whilst the solicitor accepted these 
instructions, he was negligent in failing to draft the will within a reasonable period of time 
and the client died before the will could be executed.  
 
The House of Lords held that the solicitor had a duty to the beneficiaries and this was 
established upon the basis of foreseeability, proximity and justice386. Financial loss to 
disappointed beneficiaries arising from a failure to prepare a will was clearly 
foreseeable.387 The House of Lords suggested that the category of proximity and the 
category of fairness, justness and reasonableness should be considered together. The 
court should look at the relationship and whether there ‘ought’ to be liability for 
negligence.388 It was also confirmed that when considering if there ought to be liability, 
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there is no need to prove actual and foreseeable reliance by the claimant on the 
defendant.389 
 
9.2.2 The need for justice 
 
It is clear from the judgment that the predominating factor as supported by Sir Donald 
Nicholls V-C and Steyn LJ in the Court of Appeal and Lord Goff in the House of Lords was 
to carry out practical justice and provide a remedy. The reason that the issue of justice 
was so important was that if the defendant had been successful in his argument, a curious 
anomaly would have been created in the law. The defendant had argued that he, the 
solicitor, had no duty to the beneficiaries. However, upon the basis of this argument, the 
only persons who the solicitor would have a duty towards were the testator, who was 
dead, and the executors, who had suffered no loss. Conversely, the only persons who had 
suffered loss were the beneficiaries, who had no valid claim.390 It was confirmed by the 
House of Lords that this created an unacceptable391 lacuna in the law, which must be 
filled392 due to the injustice that it created. In fact the word ‘justice’ was mentioned a total 
of twenty six times in the judgments of both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords.  
 
It was made clear however, that for the aforementioned reasons of justice, this principle 
will only apply once the testator has died. Whilst the testator is still alive, he will have a 
claim in contract and negligence.  
 
In the hearing, the appellants had raised  a public policy and ‘floodgates’ argument393, but 
this was dismissed by Lord Goff who whilst conceding that there must be boundaries to 
the availability of a remedy, stated that these would have to be worked out in the future, as 
practical problems come before the courts.394 Lord Goff approached the matter in a flexible 
and unrestrictive manner, laying down the seeds and allowing the law to evolve in the 
manner the courts thought just. It was a brave and very commendable approach. 
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The principle in White v Jones395 has been extended to the beneficiaries of an insurance 
policy. In the case of Gorham v British Telecommunications plc396 the Court of Appeal held 
that the duty of care owed by an insurance company to a customer could also be extended 
to the dependants of the customer, providing it had been made clear to the insurance 
company that the customer intended the dependants to benefit. 
 
9.2.3 Should beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust be entitled to sue? 
 
There is clear precedent for allowing the beneficiaries of a will to sue and it is contended 
that providing the professional is aware that he is dealing with a trust, the beneficiaries of 
an inter vivos trust are similar in their position to the dependents of the customer of the 
insurance company in Gorham v BT plc397.  
 
The reason for allowing the beneficiaries of a will to sue the solicitor in negligence was 
because of the lacuna in the law and the need to do justice. It is submitted that a similar 
lacuna and need to do justice is created in relation to the beneficiaries of an inter vivos 
trust where the trustee is dishonest and impecunious. If the stranger complies with the 
instructions of a dishonest trustee, negligently failing to realise that he is assisting in a 
breach of trust, his duty of care is only to the trustee, who has not suffered loss. The only 
persons who have suffered loss are the beneficiaries and if the stranger does not have a 
duty to them, then they will be unable to recover their losses.  
 
This is fundamentally different to the position where the trustees are honest and the 
stranger is dishonest. In such a circumstance, the beneficiaries could sue the trustees and 
the trustees would be able to claim an indemnity against the stranger for breaching their 
duty. Whilst this seems to reflect the degree of culpability of the trustee, it is unjust to the 
beneficiaries that they will have better prospects of recovering finances from a stranger if 
the trustee is honest, than if the trustee is dishonest. This may have been a consideration 
of Lord Selborne when he stated the requirement that the trustee was dishonest in Barnes 
v Addy, but this is only conjecture.  
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The problem with introduction of the subjective element in equity in Twinsectra398 is that 
strangers now have a defence that whilst they may be dishonest by objective standards, 
they negligently failed to realise that what they were doing was dishonest. However, surely 
justice demands that a stranger should not be afforded a civil defence for being negligent. 
 
Andrews posed the following two questions:-  
 
Does the assumption of responsibility by a solicitor or other professional to a trustee 
extend to the beneficiary who may, as a result of the solicitor’s negligence or breach 
of fiduciary duties, suffer loss?; and 
 
Is the relationship between the solicitor and beneficiary a “special relationship”?399  
 
The difficulty is that the common law does not normally recognise a beneficial interest. 
However, Andrews contended that this difficulty is not insurmountable and she referred to 
the case of Leigh and Sullivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd400. In this case, Lord 
Brandon sitting in the House of Lords, considered the difficult question of whether the 
equitable owner of property could sue in tort for negligence. Lord Brandon confirmed that:- 
 
“if the person is the equitable owner of the goods and no more, then he must join in 
the legal owner as a party to the action, either as a co-plaintiff if he is willing or as a 
co-defendant if he is not”.401 
 
It was therefore argued by Andrews that providing the trustees or fiduciaries are joined as 
co-claimants or co-defendants, then a claim in negligence may be possible by the 
beneficiaries of the trust. This would represent a very satisfactory solution to this long 
standing problem and follow in the very brave and enterprising footsteps of Lord Goff in 
White v Jones. 
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9.3 The tort of interference with contractual rights 
 
A duty not to interfere with contracting parties or cause loss by unlawful means can be 
traced back many hundreds of years. In the case of Tarleton v M’Gawley402, Lord Kenyon 
considered the position where a ship had been trading off the west coast of Africa and 
another ship deliberately fired its cannon at the native African’s canoe killing one of the 
men on board. Lord Kenyon described the firing of the cannon as ‘contriving and 
maliciously intending to hinder and deter’403. In the circumstances, the defendants were 
found to be liable. 
 
In the case of Lumley v Gye404 a singer had been enticed and procured by a third party to 
breach her contract with the claimant. The court found that the third party had knowledge 
of the transaction and had maliciously intended to injure the claimant405 and was 
consequently held liable for maliciously procuring a breach of contract.  
 
Lord Mcnaghten in Quinn v Leathern406 confirmed that interference with contractual 
relations would be a violation of a legal right, unless sufficient justification could be shown. 
However, in relation to the decision made in Lumley v Gye407, whilst he stated that the 
decision was right, he did not consider this should be on the ground of malicious intention, 
but on the ground that a violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action. 
In the same case, Lord Lindley confirmed that this principle applied to all wrongful acts 
done intentionally to damage a particular individual. 
 
In the case of D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin408 Jenkins LJ confirmed that interference 
may be direct by persuasion, procurement or inducement, or indirect such as influence of 
one kind of another.  
 
Direct interference would be regarded as a wrongful act in itself and would amount to an 
actionable interference if:- 
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(i) the third party had knowledge of the contract; and 
(ii) had the intention of bringing about the breach.409 
 
However, if the interference is indirect, the claimant must also demonstrate that the act 
itself is unlawful410 or there will be no liability.  
 
Lord Pearce confirmed in J T Stratford & Sons Ltd v Lindley411, that the third party should 
have sufficient knowledge of the terms to know that he was inducing a breach of contract.    
 
In the case of Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian412, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that ignorance of the precise terms of the sub-contract was not enough to show an 
absence of intent to procure its breach. 
 
Lord Diplock reiterated Jenkins LJ’s view in Thomson v Deakin that the third party must 
have knowledge of the existence of the contract and an intention to interfere with its 
performance in Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v Laughton and others413 
 
In Lonrho plc v Fayed414, Woolf LJ stated that liability could be imposed upon the basis of 
foresight of harm. This approach was supported in Millar v Bassey415, where the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that intention could be implied from the knowledge of the third party, in 
the absence of any reasonable explanation by the third party for his conduct. The 
approach was not however unanimous and Peter Gibson LJ delivered a dissenting 
judgment stating that the third party, by his conduct, must intend to break or otherwise 
interfere with the contract.416 
 
The subject of intentional wrongdoing was considered further in the Court of Appeal cases 
of Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3)417, Mainstream Properties Ltd v 
Young418 and OBG Ltd v Allan419. 
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In Douglas v Hello420, Lord Phillips sitting in the Court of Appeal made clear that 
foreseeability of loss would not be sufficient to establish an intention to interfere with a 
contract and approved the dissenting approach of Peter Gibson LJ in Lonrho v Fayed421. 
The conduct must be aimed or directed at the claimant, with the purpose or object of 
causing that claimant economic loss.  
 
This approach was agreed as the correct approach by Arden LJ in Mainstream Properties 
v Young422 who identified the need for a ‘specific subjective intention’423. She considered 
that the imposition of greater liability on third parties would carry with it the risk of inhibiting 
competition and entrepreneurialism.424 
 
With Mance LJ dissenting, the Court of Appeal held in OBG Ltd v Allan425 that the 
essential ingredient to establishing liability is an intention to procure a breach of a contract. 
 
All three of the aforementioned cases were then appealed to the House of Lords426. In the 
the House of Lords Lord Hoffman sought to distinguish between the torts of inducing a 
breach of contract (Lumley v Gye427), causing loss by unlawful means (Tarleton v 
M’Gawley428) and interference with contractual relations429. The latter Lord Hoffman later 
described as falling within the tort of causing loss by unlawful means430. This was subject 
to criticism and Simpson questioned why these limited reports of liabilities imposed in 
entirely different circumstances some 200 or 400 years ago should be treated as any part 
of an acceptable justification for redefining the scope of economic tort liability in the 21st 
century431 
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9.3.1 Causing loss by unlawful means 
 
Lord Hoffman described the tort of causing loss by unlawful means as432:- 
  
(i) a tort of primary liability, not requiring a wrongful act by anyone else; 
(ii) requiring the use of unlawful means; 
(iii) not depending upon the existence of contractual relations; and 
(iv) the defendant must have an intention to cause damage to the claimant. 
 
The basis of this type of claim is:- 
 
(i) a wrongful interference with the actions of a third party in which the claimant has 
an economic interest; and 
(ii) an intention to cause loss to the claimant. 
 
The wrongful interference must be unlawful433 and a defendant will not be liable for loss 
which is merely a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.434 
 
Lord Nicholls who was also sitting in the House of Lords agreed with Lord Hoffman that 
this is a ‘stand-alone’ tort imposing primary liability on a defendant for his own conduct435 
and that the conduct must be unlawful. 
 
9.3.2 Inducing a breach of contract 
 
Lord Hoffman confirmed that liability under the tort of inducing a breach of contract will be 
secondary and requires a primary breach of contract by one of the contracting parties. The 
third party’s act must be ‘wrongful’, with knowledge and intention to cause the breach of 
contract.436 
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The test for knowledge is subjective and foreseeability of damage is not sufficient to 
demonstrate an intention. The act must be ‘targeted’ or ‘aimed at’ the claimant. 
 
9.3.3 Interfering with contractual relations 
 
Lord Nicholls whilst referring to this area as ‘troubled waters’437, stated that the rationale 
and ingredients for interfering with contractual relations is the same as the tort of causing 
loss by unlawful means.438  
 
9.3.4 Comparison with the position in equity 
 
The recognition of the tort of causing loss by unlawful means and interference with a 
contract as one of primary liability is welcomed. However, this area does appear to be 
replicating the problems encountered in equity with the area being made unnecessarily 
overcomplicated with the requirement that the conduct be unlawful for interfering with a 
contract and a subjective test for knowledge to establish liability for inducing a breach of 
contract. It is therefore no surprise that two of the Law Lords sitting in the key case of OBG 
Ltd v Allan, Douglas v Hello! Ltd and Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young439 were Lord 
Hoffman and Lord Nicholls who were respectively involved in the cases in equity of 
Twinsectra440 and Royal Brunei441. This approach of concentrating on knowledge and 
intention is also similar to the approach taken in respect of fraudulent misrepresentation 
which involves criminal allegations of fraud.  
 
This area looks set to encounter the same problems as equity in the future, not least given 
the introduction of the requirement of subjective knowledge.  What is surprising is that both 
Lord Hoffman and Lord Nicholls were sitting in the case of Barlow Clowes International Ltd 
v Eurotrust International Ltd442 where the Privy Council sought to return to a solely 
objective test for dishonesty and were well aware of the problems that subjective 
requirements can cause. Lord Millett had advocated intentional wrongdoing as a way 
forward for equity, however he could not have anticipated that this would possibly 
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represent a return to the problems associated with subjective knowledge. This area of the 
common law does appear to be heading in the wrong direction and not learning from the 
difficulties encountered in equity. The next chapter will therefore look at the Privy Council 
case of Barlow Clowes443. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONSIDERATION OF BARLOW CLOWES INTERNATIONAL LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) 
AND ANOTHER V EUROTRUST INTERNATIONAL LTD AND ANOTHER444 
 
This Privy Council case related to a fraudulent offshore investment scheme operated by 
Peter Clowes through a Gibraltar company called Barlow Clowes International Ltd. The 
scheme collapsed in 1988 and Mr Clowes was convicted and sent to prison. Millions of 
pounds of funds had been dissipated through bank accounts maintained by a company 
known as International Trust Corporation (Isle of Man) Ltd (“ITC”). The Directors of ITC 
were Peter Henwood and Andrew Sebastian. A claim for dishonest assistance was 
brought by the liquidators of one of the creditors against ITC and the directors.  
 
The case against Henwood was that from the circumstances of the transactions and 
Henwood’s knowledge of the Barlow Clowes business, he must have held strong 
suspicions that the money was being misappropriated and he acted dishonesty in assisting 
in its disposal. 
 
10.1 Is the test for dishonesty objective and/or subjective? 
 
The Privy Council reviewed the position in Royal Brunei445, where it was confirmed that a 
dishonest state of mind may consist in knowledge that the transaction is one in which he 
cannot honestly participate or it may consist in suspicion combined with a conscious 
decision not to make inquiries which might result in knowledge. The Privy Council 
confirmed that:-  
 
‘Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by 
which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary 
standards a defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is 
irrelevant that the defendant judges by different standards’446. 
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In summary, the test is objective and the defendant’s subjective view of dishonesty is 
irrelevant. The Privy Council agreed with this as being the correct state of the law.447 
 
10.2 An element of ambiguity 
 
The case had been appealed to the Privy Council upon the basis that to establish a 
dishonest state of mind, it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove that the stranger was 
aware that by ordinary standards he would be regarded as dishonest. The Privy Council 
considered the case of Twinsectra448, and particularly Lord Hutton’s remarks and 
concluded that:- 
 
‘there is an element of ambiguity in these remarks which may have encouraged a 
belief, expressed in some academic writing, that Twinsectra had departed from the 
law as previously understood and invited inquiry not merely into the defendant’s 
mental state about the nature of the transaction in which he was participating but 
also into his views about generally acceptable standards of honesty’.   
 
It could be argued that there was no element of ambiguity in the remarks and Lord Hutton 
could not have been clearer, albeit his logic in applying this principle was wrong. Further 
doubt is created as Lord Hoffman as well as sitting in the Privy Council for this case, had 
also been involved in delivering the judgment in Twinsectra449 where he had concurred 
with all of Lord Hutton’s remarks on the requirement of subjective dishonesty. 
 
The Privy Council went on to explain that it was not intended in Twinsectra450 that a 
stranger should have to reflect about what normally acceptable standards of honesty were. 
It was explained that the House of Lords had considered what the defendant’s view of 
dishonesty was and then objectively decided that a solicitor who held the honest view that 
he could do with the money as he pleased, was not by normal standards dishonest451.  
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10.3 Summary 
 
Essentially, the argument was that the subjective statement in Twinsectra452 that the 
solicitor was not aware that he was acting dishonestly was a finding of fact, and upon the 
basis of this finding of fact and other considerations, the Lords objectively found that the 
stranger was not dishonest, applying the test in Royal Brunei453. However, it is difficult to 
comprehend the Privy Council’s assertion that the principles laid down in Twinsectra454 
were no different from the principles in Royal Brunei455. It is also somewhat ironic that the 
House of Lords in Twinsectra456 ‘creatively’ applied the Privy Council test in Royal 
Brunei457 to establish a subjective requirement and it has been necessary for the Privy 
Council in Barlow Clowes458 to ‘creatively’ apply the House of Lords test in Twinsectra459 to 
arrive back at the original decision in Royal Brunei460.  
 
This ‘u-turn’ has been described by academics as a ‘reinterpretation and restatement of 
Twinsectra’461, ‘more in accordance with Lord Millett’s dissent’462 and a ‘volte face by the 
Privy Council’463. The interpretation and clarification by the Privy Council was described as 
‘unconvincing’ by Yeo464, ‘implausible’ by Penner465 and ‘unpersuasive’ by Petch466. 
 
However, as confirmed by Martin, this decision has been welcomed467 and was described 
in Snell’s Equity as the ‘better view’468 and was welcomed by Lee as ‘appearing to settle 
the law at last’469. The decision did serve an important purpose and provided the 
opportunity to move away from the draconian requirement that a claimant must 
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demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant knew he was dishonest 
according to the standards of the ordinary decent person. Whilst the logic behind the 
decision may be questionable, it is nevertheless more helpful to the innocent beneficiary 
than the position prior to the judgment. In criminal law, the subjective standard only really 
helps defendants with limited intelligence or lacked capacity, however in equity the 
subjective element was open to abuse by allowing strangers the opportunity to escape 
liability upon the basis that they negligently failed to realise they were acting 
dishonestly470. 
 
The Privy Council also helpfully clarified that to establish liability it was not necessary to 
demonstrate that the stranger knew the money was being held on trust or indeed what a 
trust was471. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
CONSIDERATION OF ABOU-RAHMAH & OTHERS V ABACHA & OTHERS472  
 
This was an appeal by the claimant to the Court of Appeal. Although the defendant bank 
was represented at the court of first instance, by the time of the Appeal hearing the bank 
was no longer represented. The bank’s licence had been revoked and a winding up order 
had been made against it. Therefore, the Court of Appeal only heard submissions from the 
claimant’s legal counsel. This was described by the Court of Appeal as:-  
 
‘a matter of concern… for important issues are potentially at stake’473.  
 
This should therefore be borne in mind whilst considering this judgment. 
 
The circumstances of the case were that Mr Abou-Rahmah was a lawyer practising in 
Kuwait. He had been contacted by Mr Abacha to invest money in the capital of a family 
trust, in an Arab country. In a series of meetings between Abou-Rahmah and Abacha and 
two other fraudsters, Abou Rahmah agreed to identify suitable investments and to manage 
these investments on behalf of the trust, in return for 40% of the capital and 15% of its 
income. Over a period of time, Abou Rahmah and the other claimants were tricked into 
contributing their own money and between August 2001 and March 2002 paid over a total 
sum of US$1,375,000. 
 
The money was paid over by a number of payments, two of which were paid into the 
Nigerian bank, City Express Bank, for onward transmission to a client of the bank 
described as Trusty International. Following the money being paid over both the fraudsters 
and trust money disappeared. 
 
The claimants brought a number of claims including a claim for knowing/dishonest 
assistance. At first instance, the court accepted that the fraud amounted to a breach of 
trust, but it was not accepted that the bank had acted with the requisite knowledge or 
dishonesty and the claim failed. 
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11.1 The test 
 
Rix LJ considered what a claimant would need to prove in order to succeed in a claim for 
knowing/dishonest assistance474:- 
 
(i) The defendant must have the requisite knowledge; 
(ii) With that knowledge, the defendant must act in a way which is contrary to 
normally acceptable standards of honest conduct (an objective test); and 
(iii)  (Possibly) the defendant must in some sense be dishonest himself (a 
subjective test). 
 
Rix LJ was not clear as to the necessity of the final element of the test and inserted the 
word ‘possibly’. He also made clear that he was only ‘merely hazard[ing] this analysis’. 
This may explain why he also referred to the liability as knowing/dishonest assistance and 
indicate that he may have considered that without the subjective element the assistance 
would return to the description prior to Royal Brunei475 of knowing assistance. It is 
contended this is the case as he later in the judgment referred to liability as being knowing 
assistance only. 
 
11.2 Does the defendant need to be conscious of his own wrongdoing? 
 
Both Twinsectra and Barlow Clowes were considered by Rix LJ, who refused to enter into 
the controversy created by the conflicting statements on the question of subjective 
dishonesty. Instead he stated:-  
 
‘it was ‘sufficient to concentrate on what was said in Barlow Clowes about the 
element of knowledge required’.476  
 
In this respect, he stated there may be sufficient knowledge in suspicion and the stranger 
did not need to know that the money was held in trust at all. 
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Again, in this case, the trial judge had made a finding that the defendant was not dishonest 
and the effect of going against this finding would be the need to order a retrial. Rix LJ 
confirmed the Court of Appeal were not in a position to reverse this finding477 as the judge 
had heard the evidence. 
 
Arden LJ confirmed that the Court of Appeal should follow the decision in Barlow 
Clowes478 on the issue of dishonesty, that:- 
 
‘it is unnecessary to show subjective dishonesty in the sense of consciousness that 
the transaction is dishonest. It is sufficient that the defendant knows of the elements 
of the transaction which make it dishonest according to normally accepted 
standards of behaviour’.479 
 
Arden LJ explained that Barlow Clowes480 had ‘clarified’ that the interpretation of 
Twinsectra481 as requiring subjective dishonesty was wrong. A defendant did not need to 
be conscious of his wrongdoing and the test of dishonesty is predominantly objective, with 
subjective aspects482.  
 
11.3 The outcome of the judgment 
 
For reasons outlined in the judgment, Arden LJ confirmed that the law laid down in the 
Twinsectra483 case, as interpreted in the Privy Council in Barlow Clowes484, represented 
the law of England and Wales.485 
 
Both Rix LJ and Arden LJ also considered the possibility of the equitable remedy of 
restitution which will be considered next. 
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CHAPTER 12 
 
THE EQUITABLE REMEDY OF RESTITUTION  
 
Restitution was suggested by Saiman to have emerged as a ‘global phenomenon’486. Lord 
Steyn observed in Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd487 that unjust 
enrichment ranks next to contract and tort as part of the law of obligations. It is an 
independent source of rights and obligations488.  He confirmed the appropriate questions 
to be asked in a case of restitutionary remedy were:- 
  
(i) Has the defendant been enriched at the third party’s expense? 
(ii) Was the enrichment at the expense of the claimant? 
(iii) Was the enrichment unjust? 
(iv) Are there any defences? 489 
 
12.1 The amount that can be recovered 
 
It is submitted that the difficulty of calling upon the equitable remedy of restitution against 
an intermeddling stranger, is the amount that can be recovered. The claimant will only 
likely be able to recover:- 
 
(i) the value received by the defendant at the claimant’s expense; or alternatively 
(ii) the value surviving in the defendant’s hands.490 
 
This is unlikely to help the beneficiaries of a trust, as the stranger will usually be a solicitor, 
accountant or other professional and the only unjust enrichment will be their fees in acting 
for the trustees/fiduciary. This will be of little consolation to beneficiaries who have suffered 
a major loss of trust funds. Further, it would appear unjust enrichment is more appropriate 
to the recovery of trust property, where equity already recognises a remedy of imposing a 
constructive trust for ‘knowing receipt’. 
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12.2 ‘Something inequitable’ 
 
In the case of Abou-Rahmah491, Lord Rix considered the possibility of a claim in restitution, 
as the claimants had made the payments under a mistake of fact. He identified that the 
claimant must show ‘something inequitable’492, or citing Moore-Bick J in Niru Battery 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Milestone Trading:- 
 
‘something capable of embracing a failure to act in a commercially acceptable way’; 
or 
‘a sharp practice of a kind that falls short of outright dishonesty ‘.493  
 
Lord Rix found there to be a causal link between the opening of the bank account and the 
loss and the bank receiving the money beneficially. Whilst the causal link appears logical, 
Lord Rix’s assertion that the bank received the money beneficially does create difficulty. 
The purpose of a bank is to ‘look after money’ for an account holder, not to borrow the 
money from an account holder to use as it sees fit. Therefore a bank is never the 
beneficial owner of the money. It must therefore regrettably follow that Lord Rix was wrong 
in finding that the bank had received the money beneficially. It is regrettable because if it 
had been correct, this would go some way to creating a means of compensation to the 
innocent victims of fraud. Difficulty also arises in that as the bank did not have beneficial 
ownership it could not have been unjustly enriched to the value of the money paid into the 
account.  
 
Arden LJ also considered the position of restitution in Abou Rahmah494 and noted that the 
bank had not received the funds beneficially, so was not in the same position as a party 
who receives funds for its own use and benefit.495 As stated by Professor Burrows496:- 
 
‘it is imperative that, even on the wide formation, there is a sufficient causal link 
between the defendant’s unjust enrichment and his pecuniary loss’. 
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12.3 Summary 
 
Whilst Rix LJ has slightly opened the possibility of a claim for restitution, it is submitted that 
even if a claim is established, the amount to which the stranger has been unjustly 
enriched, whilst the money is in the account, will be negligible. As confirmed by Grantham 
and Rickett gains made by the defendant and the loss to be repaired to the plaintiff are 
‘opposite sides of the same coin’497. Essentially, the defendant is only liable therefore to 
the extent of the gains that he has made or has been unjustly enriched. 
 
There is the possibility that if a stranger was to receive some indirect benefit as a 
consequence of assisting in a breach of trust, such as an increase in the value of assets 
owned, and if this could be directly causally linked, then a claim for unjust enrichment may 
be possible. However, this is certainly likely to be very difficult to prove and will be the 
exception rather than the norm.  
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CHAPTER 13 
 
IS THE REQUIREMENT OF DISHONESTY STILL APPROPRIATE AS THE TEST FOR 
EQUITABLE LIABILITY? 
 
The early cases for knowing/dishonest assistance focused on the knowledge of the 
stranger498. Barnes v Addy499 introduced the requirement that the stranger must be:- 
 
 ‘cognisant of a dishonest design on the part of the trustee’.500 
 
Cognisant means to have knowledge or to suspect501. The test to be applied was:- 
 
‘whether the [stranger] ought or ought not from the circumstances of the case, be 
held to have been aware that something wrong was intended’.502 
 
When arriving at the decision, the court will take account of what ‘evidence, justice and 
reason’ demands.503 This infrequently reported consideration provides a similar approach 
to that which the common law has taken in the final stage of the special relationship test to 
establish a negligent misrepresentation504. In the common law, the court will consider if it is 
just and reasonable for the law to impose the duty. 
 
Prior to the early 1990s, it was accepted in a number of cases that the test for constructive 
objective knowledge in Selangor505 was the correct approach.506 The test was:- 
 
 ‘what should the stranger have known from the facts apparent to him?’; and 
what would a reasonable person have concluded from these facts?’.507 
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Constructive knowledge was defined in Baden508 as:-  
 
‘knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and 
reasonable man or put him on inquiry.’ 
 
However, Megarry VC led the move away from constructive knowledge, to a requirement 
of actual knowledge in the early 1990s509, which was subsequently followed by the 
introduction in Royal Brunei510  of dishonesty as a necessary and essential ingredient to 
liability.511 Whilst equating dishonesty to unconscionable conduct and want of probity, Lord 
Nicholls made clear that the standard to be applied was objective512 and stated:- 
 
‘the individual is expected to attain the standard which would be observed by an 
honest person placed in those circumstances’.513 
 
This is an appropriate test to apply for unconscionable conduct and want of probity, but is 
not a test for dishonesty. Therefore the problem seems to arise from Lord Nicholls 
insistence in describing this as a standard for dishonesty. Unconscionable conduct and 
want of probity are not the same as dishonesty. 
 
This problem was further exacerbated by Lord Hutton’s focus on the stranger’s state of 
mind and the need for conscious impropriety in Twinsectra514. Despite Lord Nicholls 
making clear the standard was objective, the majority of the House of Lords imposed a 
Ghosh515 style criminal test to what is an equitable liability. This was criticised by 
academics516 and by the dissenting Lord Millett517 as a wrong application of the law. As 
confirmed by Sir Anthony Clarke MR caution should be exercised when drawing analogies 
between tests from different areas of law which is prone to lead to confusion. 518 
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Lord Millett confirmed that the court’s focus should be on the stranger’s conduct and not 
his state of mind. He stated:- 
 
‘consciousness of wrongdoing is an aspect of mens rea which is an appropriate 
condition of criminal liability: it is not an appropriate condition of civil liability’.519 
 
The fusion of criminal law into equity created by the combined test in Twinsectra520, has 
led to both problems and confusion.  
 
Even the criminal courts have encountered difficulty in assessing the standard of 
dishonesty, due to the necessity of having to characterise the existing facts and then make 
a judgment upon the basis of an undefined moral standard.521 It has often led in trials to a 
disproportionate amount of time being spent on the issue.522  
 
The offence of handling stolen goods has also demonstrated the difficulties that can be 
faced from applying a subjective test to knowledge.523 
 
Whilst the Fraud Act 2006 incorporated the requirement of dishonesty to the majority of 
fraud offences covered by it, the offences of possession of articles for use in fraud524 and 
making or supplying articles for use in fraud525 had no express requirement for dishonesty. 
Making or supplying articles requires knowledge or intention and the Government have 
suggested that a general intention is required for possession of articles.526 However, 
interestingly the offence of possession does not contain any statutory mens rea. 
 
The requirement of dishonesty is a key element of the tort of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.527 Similarly, as with dishonest assistance, a subjective element has 
crept into this area528 and the requirement of dishonesty has also led to the burden of 
proof in cases where fraud and dishonesty is alleged, as higher than the civil burden of ‘on 
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the balance of probabilities’.529 It is therefore a far more arduous task to succeed in a claim 
where fraud or dishonesty is alleged. 
 
Misrepresentation can also be carried out negligently. A third party to a contract will be 
liable if there is a special relationship, which is ascertained by a three stage test of 
reasonable forseeability, sufficient proximity and if it is just and reasonable in the 
circumstances530 or alternatively, if there has been an assumption of responsibility.531  
 
The problems third parties face in suing in the common law arises from the privity of 
contract rules. This rule has been recognised by the judiciary532, the Law Commission533 
and Parliament534 as restrictive and harsh to innocent third parties. However, the common 
law has seemingly developed to deal with the issue of privity of contract in the cases of 
White v Jones535 and Gorham v BT plc536. It also seems the common law has taken, in 
these cases, the first steps towards allowing a claim by beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust 
in negligence. As stated by Andrews 537, the case of Leigh and Sullivan Ltd v Aliakmon 
Shipping Co Ltd538 may suggest that it is already possible for the equitable owner of a 
property to sue in tort for negligence.  
 
It is therefore somewhat ironic that the original purpose of equity was to ‘plug the gaps in 
the common law’ and it now seems that the common law is effectively ‘plugging the gaps 
in equity’, by recognising equitable ownership as giving sufficient locus standi for a person 
to sue. This does highlight the urgent need for the courts in equity to address whether an 
equitable interest should give a claimant sufficient locus standi to raise a claim in equity, 
but this is perhaps an area for consideration in further research. 
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A lot of the problems seem to arise from the reference to negligence. Gardner considered 
it is probably wrong to rule out a negligence liability in knowing assistance on the basis 
that it would overlap with a similar liability in contract or tort, rather than on more 
substantive grounds.539 However, reference to negligence for this type of liability is best 
avoided and forgotten. Negligence is a tort in the common law and should remain separate 
from equitable liability. Even if the test and outcome are similar in equity, it should not be 
described as negligence. They are two separate areas of law and this fixation on the term 
‘negligence’ has led to many of the twists and turns and confusion in this area. Equity and 
the common law should remain separate. Negligence is evolving in the common law and 
has recognised the interests of beneficiaries and should be encouraged to evolve further.  
 
In equity, the Privy Council in Barlow Clowes540 has fortunately moved back to the position 
where the appropriate test to be applied is objective and where the defendant’s subjective 
view of dishonesty is not relevant541. The Court of Appeal in Abou Rahmah542 has 
confirmed this as a correct interpretation of the judgment in Twinsectra.543 The difficulty is 
that Twinsectra544 as a House of Lords judgment, still remains the leading judgment in 
relation to this matter and whilst the interpretation of the Twinsectra545 judgment was 
welcomed it is a very ‘creative’ interpretation of the judgment in Twinsectra546. As identified 
by Kiri, until the Supreme Court opines on the issue the uncertainty is likely to persist for 
some time547.  
 
This is therefore an area in urgent need of review by the Supreme Court. The Privy 
Council and Court of Appeal have sounded a welcome retreat from the requirement of 
subjective dishonesty. The answer to the problems, as has already been alluded to by Rix 
LJ in the Court of Appeal judgment in Abou Rahmah548, would be to remove the 
requirement of dishonesty altogether and return to the requirement of knowledge which is 
ascertained by an objective test. Momentum should be allowed to gain, to return to a 
requirement of constructive objective knowledge being sufficient, as confirmed in the 
                                                     
539
 Simon Gardner, ‘Knowing assistance and knowing receipt: taking stock’ [1996] LQR 56, 75. 
540
 Barlow Clowes (n 442). 
541
 ibid [10]. 
542
 Abou Rahmah (n 472). 
543
 Twinsectra (n 12). 
544
 Twinsectra (n 12). 
545
 Twinsectra (n 12). 
546
 Twinsectra (n 12). 
547
 Kiri (n 190) 305. 
548
 Abou Rahmah (n 472) [16]. 
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cases of Selangor549, Karak550, Baden551 and Agip552 with an additional requirement that it 
must be ‘just and reasonable’ to impose liability, as considered by Lord Selborne in Barnes 
v Addy553. It has been an eventful voyage, but even the most intrepid of explorers know 
when to turn around, re-trace their steps and set off again in a new direction. This time has 
now arrived for the equitable liability of dishonest assistance and to return to a liability for 
knowing assistance. 
 
In Barnes v Addy554 commercial realities and public policy weighed heavily on the judge’s 
mind, but one quote by Lord Selborne is very relevant to the position today:- 
 
‘[there is] no better mode of undermining the sound doctrines of Equity than to 
make unreasonable and inequitable applications of them’.555 
 
The current position is a stranger may have knowledge of a trust, knowledge of a breach 
of trust and assist in that breach of trust and escape liability for not being dishonest. The 
effect of this may be to deprive an innocent beneficiary, who has suffered large financial 
loss, of a means of recovery. This is a wholly inequitable application of this doctrine and 
the requirement of dishonesty undermines what is otherwise a sound doctrine of equity. As 
referred to by Lord Bingham in Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank556 and 
originally stated in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council557 the rule of public policy, 
which has first claim on the loyalty of the law, is that wrongs should be remedied. 
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